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The Uniform Arbitration Act [hereinafter U.A.A.] was proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955.2
At present, approximately thirty-five states have adopted arbitration statutes
patterned after the U.A.A. 3 The purposes of this annual article are to
provide a survey of recent developments in the case law interpreting and
applying the various state versions of the U.A.A.; develop and explain the
underlying principles and rationales that courts have applied in particular
cases; and promote uniformity in the interpretation of the U.A.A. by
providing courts and practitioners with a framework for analyzing similar
future cases.4
2. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr f§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.A.A.].
3. Jurisdictions which have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the U.A.A. are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
4. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1988 3. Disp. REs. 247
[hereinafter Recent Developments 1988]; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1987
Mo. J. DIsp. REs. 177 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1987]; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. Disp. RES. 169 [hereinafter Recent Developments 19861;
Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RES. 173 [hereinafter
Recent Developments 1985]; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J.
Disp. REs. 207 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1984]; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1983) [hereinafter Recent Developments 1983]. Recent
Developments 1988 collected cases decided between September, 1986 and September, 1987.
[Vol. 1989
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I. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The U.A.A. provides that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing
controversy to arbitration . . . is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. "5  Courts and legislatures alike routinely state the policies
promoting arbitration. Because most states favor the settlement of disputes
through arbitration, there is a tendency for courts to find a valid arbitration
agreement.
A. Application of Contract Principles
Pursuant to the U.A.A., principles of law and equity are applied by the
courts as grounds for the revocation of a contract to arbitrate or a contract
with an arbitration clause.6 This provision of the U.A.A. enables courts to
supply principles of contract law to questions of validity.
The requirement that contracts be in writing effects arbitration clauses.
Although the U.A.A. requires that an agreement to arbitrate be in writing,7
an Illinois appellate court in Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects
International,8 held that a writing was not required. Plaintiff, a development
company, entered into an agreement with an architectural firm.9 The form
agreement contained a provision which required arbitration of any disputes.1 °
Plaintiff never signed or returned the form." Defendants performed services
for plaintiff from October to December of 1983, while plaintiff did not pay
for the services.'2 Finally, defendant architect filed a demand for arbitration
against the plaintiff.13 Several months later, plaintiff advised the American
Recent Developments 1987 collected cases decided between September, 1985 and September,
1986. Recent Developments 1986 collected cases decided between September, 1984 and
September, 1985. Recent Developments 1985 collected cases decided between September, 1983
and September, 1984. Recent Developments 1984 collected cases decided between September,
1982 and September, 1983. Recent Developments 1983 collected cases decided before
September, 1982. This article surveys cases decided between September, 1987 and September,
1988.
5. U.A.A. § 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 172 III. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (III. App. Ct. 1988).




13. Id. at _, 526 N.E.2d at 605.
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Arbitration Association that they were not bound to arbitrate. 4 The trial
court ruled that a contract existed as a result of the parties' conduct, and
the contract included a requirement to arbitrate disputes. 5
The issue on appeal was the existence of an arbitration agreement. 6
The Illinois appellate court followed simple contract law. The plaintiff did
not dispute the existence of a contract, but did dispute the existence of an
arbitration agreement. 7 The court found that the parties' conduct related
specifically to the written contract and not the oral agreement.'8 This is
significant as the U.A.A. clearly requires a writing in Section 1, and the
court apparently equates conduct related to a written agreement as within
this writing requirement.
B. Piecemeal Resolution
Parties who want to avoid arbitration often argue that arbitration will
engender piecemeal resolution of the conflict. Landmark Properties also
addressed the question of piecemeal resolution, but the court did not accept
the plaintiff's argument that arbitration would harm them. Plaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the appellate court that the action
should not be arbitrated because other lawsuits were pending against them
regarding this same development.20 Plaintiff also argued that an arbitration
agreement should not be enforced when actions are pending involving some
of the same facts.2 ' The court held that "the policy favoring arbitration will
not be ignored simply because multiple parties and claims may be present."'
The Florida District Court of Appeals in SteinberglW.F.I. Foods, Inc. v.
D.C.M and Associates,' agreed with Landmark's analysis. In this case,
Steinberg sought to compel arbitration after D.C.M. filed suit pursuant to






19. Id. at 603.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at _, 526 N.E.2d at 607.
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UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
District Court of Appeals reversed and the arbitration agreement was held
valid.2'
The appellate court addressed D.C.M.'s argument that a "'piecemeal' and
expensive resolution would result" if the Court required a portion of the suit
to be arbitrated while the remainder would be tried in court.26 The
appellate court adopted the reasoning of the Third District: "[W]e cannot
accept the proposition that a party to a contract calling for arbitration may
avoid that undertaking by the simple device of joining as defendants in its
lawsuit others with which the party has no such agreement to arbitrate."
27
The court reasoned that to avoid arbitration in this case would "fly in the
face of the Florida legislature's intention" as set forth in the Florida
Arbitration Code, which is similar to the U.A.A. § 1.28
In general, public policy considerations favor the resolution of disputes
in arbitration for a variety of reasons. Among these are speed, less expense,
and a reduced burden on the judicial system. However, it must be
remembered that arbitration is a forum created, controlled, and administered
by the written agreement.
II. WAIVER
A party may waive the right to arbitration by taking actions inconsistent
with their contractual rights to arbitration. Inconsistent actions may consist
of a failure to exercise rights to compel arbitration under the arbitration
agreement; a failure to raise claims; a failure to object to arbitrability; or
a failure to assert grounds for vacation of the arbitrator's decision.
A. Right to Compel Arbitration
1. Repudiation of the Arbitration Agreement
A waiver of the right to compel arbitration may be retracted when the
waiver is based on a repudiation of the arbitration agreement.' In Gilmore
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,30 the court concluded a party must show
that an "amended complaint changed the scope or theory of the previous
25. Id. at 513.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assoc. 412 So.2d 871, 875
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 419 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1982)).
28. 522 So.2d at 513. Compare U.A.A. § 1 with FLA. STAT. § 682.01 (1988).
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asserted claims thus nullifying its earlier waiver in order to revive its right
to compel arbitration."31 In Gilmore, the plaintiff charged his stockbroker
with milking his securities account thereby causing him $143,000 in actual
damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. 3  The parties had an
agreement that any controversy arising out of or relating to the customer's
account would be settled by arbitration.33 The complaint asserted violation
of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, and common law fraud.' Later, Gilmore amended his
complaint to include a RICO violation seeking treble damages.35 Prior to
the RICO claim, Shearson waived its rights to compel arbitration; after the
RICO claim, Shearson wanted those rights reinstated.36
The district court found that "the addition of the RICO claim certainly
add[ed] a new 'theory' to plaintiffs case."37 Before the amended complaint,
Shearson made a "business determination" to forego its right to arbitration
of the common law claims since both § 10(b) and the subsequent RICO
claims were ruled non-arbitrable. 3  In the interim, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that both RICO and § 10(b) claims were arbitrable.39
The district court said that because the "foundation of that decision
(Shearson's) was eroded by plaintiffs successful motion to amend the
complaint and by an intervening change in the law," that, "in fairness,
Shearson should be able to revive its right to move to compel arbitration
of the § 10(b) claims."' The court ruled that as to the common law claims,
Shearson's original waiver was enforceable because the addition of the
RICO claim did not sufficiently "erode" the decision to litigate those
claims.41
Likewise, in Peterson v. Shearson/American Express,42 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Shearson had not
repudiated the arbitration agreement even though they failed to raise
31. Id. at 316.
32. Id. at 315.
33. Id. at 320.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 316.
37. Id. at 317.
38. Id. at 317.
39. Id. at 318. The U.S. Supreme Court decided this issue in Shearson/American Express
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
40. Id. at 318.
41. Id. at 319.
42. 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 1989
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arbitration as a defense to a federal claim under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act.43 The complaint stated five pendant state claims in addition
to the federal claim.' At the time of filing, claims based on the Securities
Act were considered non-arbitrable. s Shearson failed to assert arbitration
as a defense to any of the claims until just prior to trial and after taking
depositions." While the case was awaiting trial, the United States Supreme
Court held that § 10(b) claims were arbitrable.
The court in Peterson held that waiver of the right to compel arbitration
as to the state law claims was enforceable based on the well-settled law that
precludes arbitration once substantial preparation for litigation has
occurred."8 However, with regard to the § 10(b) claim, the court concluded
that applying the new rule to pending cases was warranted as the new rule
overturned a precedent upon which the litigants had relied and the
application of it would not create "substantial inequity."49 The court
reasoned that "because Shearson almost certainly could not have obtained
an order for arbitration of the Section 10(b)-5 claim prior to McMahon, it
did not waive its right to arbitrate the claim."50
2. Participation in Litigation
Recent cases have held that one of the clearest ways to waive the right
to arbitration is by participating in certain types of legal proceedings that
are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate.5 ' However, whether there is or
has been litigation between the parties is not alone sufficient to indicate a
waiver. The inquiry must proceed deeper to determine the nature of the
actions taken by the parties, who initiated the action, and whether there has
been conduct demonstrating an intent to waive arbitration.2
43. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 465.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id. at 468.
47. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
48. Peterson, 849 F.2d at 468.
49. Id. at 466.
50. Id.
51. Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1, 142 l1. App. 3d 533, 536, 491 N.E.2d 1322,
1325 (1986).
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In Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority,53 Jackson
entered into a contract with Mid States to repair damaged railroad lines.
Mid States, being displeased with the quality of the work performed, filed
a court action for possession of Jackson's equipment and then seized the
equipment.5 4  In response, Jackson filed an action for a mandatory
injunction and replevin but specifically reserved the right to arbitration.5
After submitting to arbitration and receiving an unfavorable verdict, Mid
States claimed that Jackson had waived its right to arbitration by submitting
part of the arbitrable matter to the courts in its request for the injunction
and replevin. 6 The Supreme Court of Kansas, after noting that waiver
results from the relinquishment of a known right, held that Jackson had not
waived its right to arbitration." The court reasoned that nothing Jackson
had done could be interpreted to constitute waiver since the court
proceedings in which they participated were merely in response to Mid
States' court proceedings, and Jackson expressly reserved its right to
arbitration.58
The same type of issue arose in Atkins v. Rustic Wood Partners"9 with a
different result. In that case, Atkins, a limited partner, brought an action
against the partnership alleging the breach of a fiduciary duty in the sale of
property belonging to the partnership.' The partners, after taking some
legal action, which was merely responsive to the claim filed by Atkins, filed
a petition for dissolution of the partnership and distribution of its assets.61
The Illinois Court of Appeals agreed with Atkins' claim that the partnership
had waived its right to arbitration by taking action in court that was
inconsistent with the right to arbitration.62 The court noted that while most
of the partnership's court action was merely in response to Atkins' claim,
its petition seeking dissolution of the partnership and distribution of its
assets evidenced an intent to pursue rights in court and waive arbitration.'
53. 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122 (1988).
54. Id. at , 751 P.2d at 124.
55. Id.
56. Id. at _, 751 P.2d at 129.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 171 Il1. App. 3d. 373, 525 N.E.2d 551 (1988).
60. Id. at , 525 N.E.2d at 553.
61. Id. at __, 525 NE.2d at 554.
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In Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Services Co.," Comprehensive
contracted to provide the use of their trade name to Lawrence as part of
a franchise agreement. After discovering that affiliation with Comprehensive
might jeopardize the status of Lawrence's certified public accountant's
license, Lawrence commenced an action in state court seeking to declare the
agreement illegal and unenforceable. 65 Comprehensive moved to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration under the agreement; the district court
granted the motion." Lawrence appealed, arguing that Comprehensive had
waived its right to arbitration by instituting earlier proceedings against
Lawrence in small claims court.67 The court of appeals, noting that
Lawrence was the party that instituted the present action, found there was
nothing to evidence Comprehensive's intent to waive arbitration.'
One court has held that a failure to take action is evidence of a waiver
of the right to arbitrate. In Detweiler v. JC. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.,'
the court held that a party waived the right to arbitrate by failing to
participate in court proceedings.7' In the case, Detweiler was injured when
he shot at his own car as it was being driven away by an uninsured
motorist.7 Detweiler filed a claim under the uninsured motorist clause of
the insurance policy which J.C. Penney promptly rejected. 72 Detweiler then
brought an action against the third party uninsured motorist to resolve the
issue of damages and liability.73 Throughout the filing, pendency, and
resolution of the case, J.C. Penney, although fully apprised as to what was
occurring in the case, failed to take any action that would indicate an intent
to have the liability and damages issues resolved by arbitration.74 The court
concluded that J.C. Penney's inaction was tantamount to its taking action
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate which resulted in a waiver of the right
to arbitrate.75
64. 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 1160-61.
66. Id. at 1161.
67. Id. at 1164.
68. Id. at 1164-65.
69. 110 Wash. 2d 99, 751 P.2d 282 (1988).
70. Id. at 110, 751 P.2d at 288.
71. Id. at 101, 751 P.2d at 283.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 112, 751 P.2d at 288.
75. Id. at 110, 751 P.2d at 288.
19891
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The court in Kayne v. PaineWebber, Inc.76 faced the issue of whether
PaineWebber had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Kayne filed
a five-count complaint against PaineWebber concerning securities violations.
Counts I and II alleged violations of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. Count III alleged a RICO violation and counts IV and V
alleged violations of various state laws regarding securities. PaineWebber
did not move to compel arbitration of counts III, IV, and V which were
considered arbitrable under the contract between the parties, but instead
moved to dismiss all five counts.77 The court dismissed the § 10(b) claims
on the merits leaving PaineWebber to litigate on the remaining claims which
were originally arbitrable under the contract.78 Kayne argued that Paine-
Webber waived its right to arbitrate by filing and pursuing its motion to
dismiss. 9 The court agreed, stating that a party "may not 'forum shop' by
first asking a court to examine the merits of his claims and then, if
displeased with the result, demandfing] that the court send them to an
arbitrator. .80
A contradictory result was reached in Hillman v. Nationwide Fire
Insurance Co."' This case involved a claim based on an uninsured motorist
policy. Julie Hillman was killed while driving an all terrain vehicle when
a truck driven by an uninsured driver struck her vehicle.2 The court held
that Nationwide, plaintiff's insurer, had not waived its right to arbitrate the
underlying uninsured motorists claim even though it had acted in bad faith
by not disclosing the availability of the arbitration procedure to the
Hillmans in four separate pieces of correspondence. 83 Because of Nation-
wide's bad faith, the Hillmans elected to seek relief through the court
system and were represented by counsel who knew that the policy required
arbitration.!
On appeal, the Hillmans objected to Nationwide's motion to compel
arbitration on the basis of Nationwide's bad faith in failing to disclose the
availability of arbitration.u The court noted that because "a plaintiff cannot
claim waiver when the plaintiff initiates court action in violation of the
76. 684 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
77. Id. at 980.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 981.
81. 758 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1988).
82. Id. at 1249.
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arbitration clause" and that because "none of the litigants herein has clean
hands," a presumption in favor of the contractually mandated arbitration
would be enforced as long as no demonstrated prejudice was shown.s6 This
result contradicts the idea that waiver occurs when the parties begin
proceedings inconsistent with the right to arbitrate. However, the court
weighed several factors, including bad faith on the part of both parties with
the strong policy reasons in favor of arbitration.
3. Failure to Make a Timely Assertion
A waiver of the right to compel arbitration does not occur for failure
to make a timely assertion of those rights pursuant to a state's statute of
limitations unless the parties agree that the statute of limitations applies. 7
In Cameron v. Griffith,88 the parties entered into a contract whereby
Cameron was to receive one-third of the proceeds of any subsequent sale
by Griffith of company stocks or assets. The agreement provided that any
disputes concerning the contract were subject to arbitration.' Griffith sold
company assets to a third party but failed to distribute any proceeds to
Cameron." More than four years later, Cameron filed a demand for
arbitration with respect to the proceeds. Griffith objected on the grounds
that the statute of limitations had run, leaving the arbitrators no authority
to hear the case.9" The arbitrators rejected this argument and awarded
Cameron one-third of the proceeds.92
The appellate court upheld the arbitrators' finding that no waiver had
occurred. The court read the North Carolina arbitration act as applying
only to an "action."' The court interpreted the word "action" to refer to a
"judicial proceeding" and stated that an arbitration hearing is not a judicial
proceeding.' Since "the contract itself does not limit the period in which
arbitration can be demanded and no statute or court decision of this state
of which we are aware does so either," the court held that arbitration is
not barred. 95
86. Id.






93. Id., (construing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.1 -.20 (1983)).
94. Cameron, 91 N.C. App. at _, 370 S.E.2d at 704.
95. Id. at _, 370 S.E.2d at 705.
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On the other hand, an Illinois court concluded a party loses the right
to arbitrate a claim if the request to exercise that right is made "too late"
under the Illinois arbitration act.' In Izzo v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 9
the court found that a two-year delay by the employer and union in seeking
arbitration was not in accordance with the act, which required that disputes
be submitted to arbitration "as soon as practicable."" The court concluded
that "an employee who has been prevented from exhausting his or her
contractual remedies by a union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance
is free to resort to federal court to pursue his or her claims against both the
union and the employer."99
B. Right to Object to Arbitrability
A party's action in submitting to an arbitration proceeding on the merits
of the claim without raising an objection to the arbitration prior to the
proceeding constitutes a waiver of the right to object to arbitrability. In
Cady v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"° Anita Cady filed an insurance claim for
emotional distress and loss of consortium incurred as a result of witnessing
her husband being struck by an automobile. When the insurance company
denied her claim, the Cadys filed suit in district court, and the insurance
company invoked an arbitration clause in the policy."' 1  The Cadys
participated in the arbitration proceeding on the merits and raised the claim
that the dispute was not subject to arbitration only after the arbitrator had
decided the case in favor of the insurance company.'0 2 The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that participation in an arbitration proceeding on the merits
is a waiver of the right to raise the issue of arbitrability absent preservation
of the objection prior to the arbitration proceeding.103
C. Right to Assert Grounds for Vacation
A party to an arbitration proceeding may waive the right to assert
grounds for vacation of an award by failing to enter a timely appeal. The
96. Izzo v. AT&T Communications, Inc., No. 85C8938 (N.D. III. Nov. 25, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
97. Id. at _.
98. Id. at _ (construing ILL REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 20 (1985)).
99. Izzo, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at.
100. 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
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Supreme Court of Colorado reached this result in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cabs, Inc."° State Farm brought an action on
behalf of one of its policy holders for injuries in an accident involving a cab
owned by the defendant." s The parties submitted to arbitration where the
defendant raised a constitutional challenge to the statute authorizing
arbitration."° After an unfavorable ruling on its claim and after the time
for appeals had elapsed, the defendant sought to vacate the judgment. 7
The supreme court held that the defendant's failure to enter a timely appeal
from the arbitrator's judgment constituted a waiver of its right to object to
confirmation of the arbitrator's award.1t°
Ill. ARBITRABILITY
A. Eristence of Agreements
Prior to the passage of federal and state arbitration acts, the law was
biased against arbitration."° The common law belief was that contractual
agreements to arbitrate future disputes were readily revokable by either
party at any time.H° Today, however, arbitration is a viable and desireable
form of dispute resolution, and parties enter into arbitration agreements
routinely."1 ' Whether a certain claim is arbitrable is determined by the
existence of an agreement, the scope of the agreement, and the intent of the
parties."n When determining the scope of an agreement, the court looks to
the specific language of the arbitration clause. Some clauses specifically
define the type of claims which will be submitted to arbitration." 3
Conversely, other clauses stating "any controversy shall be subject to
104. 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988).
105. Id. at 62.
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 67.




113. For example, some collective bargaining agreements provide that the union will
represent the employee in a wrongful discharge complaint and will not provide representation
in other areas. Additionally, insurance policies may provide for specific claims under a certain
dollar amount to be submitted to arbitration.
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arbitration" are interpreted broadly."4 However, even when a clause is
broadly interpreted, courts are unwilling to relinquish jurisdiction over
certain claims."5
1. Revocation of Agreements
The issue of revocation of an arbitration agreement was raised in
Hawker v. Northern Michigan Hospital, Inc."' According to an agreement
signed by the decedent upon her admission to the hospital, any dispute
between the hospital and the patient was to be submitted to arbitration."7
The duty to arbitrate could be revoked if written notice was sent to the
hospital within sixty days of release." 8 Plaintiff claimed a letter was sent to
the defendant hospital's administrator revoking arbitration within the sixty
day prescribed time limit."9
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that the letter
revoking arbitration was not received within the sixty day period allowed by
the agreement. 12 The appellate court further emphasized that the Michigan
Uniform Arbitration Act also prescribed a sixty day period for revocation.'
2. Unsigned Agreements
A signed, written agreement to arbitrate is not necessary to bind the
parties to arbitration if the parties treat the agreement as though it was in
effect. In Wetzel v. Sullivan,1?2 plaintiff, a former law firm partner, filed for
arbitration pursuant to the terms of an unsigned arbitration agreement when
the plaintiff and the defendant could not agree as to the value of plaintiff's
114. See Frates v. Edward D. Jones, No. 88-120 (Mont. Aug. 23, 1988) (WESTLAW, MT-
CS, State file).
115. Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645 (Kan. 1988) (Court did
not allow the tortious act of wrongful discharge from employment to be submitted to
arbitration.).
116. 164 Mich. App. 314, 416 N.W.2d 428 (1987).
117. Id. at 317, 416 N.W.2d at 430.
118. Id. at 318, 416 N.W.2d at 430.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id. (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5042(3) (1987). This section states, "[tjhe
agreement to arbitrate fwith hospitals and health care facilities] shall provide the person
receiving health care or treatment or his legal representative, but not the hospital, may revoke
the agreement within 60 days after discharge from the hospital by notifying the hospital in
writing.").
122. 745 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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stock in the firm and the proper allocation of fees from two contingent fee
cases. 23 The defendant had drafted and prepared a shareholders and
compensation agreement. The agreements were circulated to each
shareholder. The plaintiff signed the agreement; however, the president and
six of the shareholders did not sign.24
In reversing the lower court's decision denying arbitration, the appellate
court noted that arbitration is generally favored by courts and every
reasonable presumption will be indulged to uphold arbitration proceedings.'25
The court ruled that the defendant was estopped from denying the existence
of the agreement because it had ratified the agreements as a matter of
law. 26 Ratification occurs when a party recognizes the validity of a contract
by acting under it, or affirmatively acknowledging it.'2 7 Here, the court
found that the defendant had ratified the proposed contract by treating it
as though it were in effect throughout the two year negotiation period and
by accepting benefits and issuing stock pursuant to the agreement.'28
Another court also agreed that conduct can bind parties to an
arbitration provision contained in an unsigned contract. In Landmark
Properties Inc. v. Architects International,2" the evidence indicated that the
defendant sent a written contract, which contained an arbitration provision,
to the plaintiffs because it felt the services it had been required to perform
in the original agreement were not clearly defined. The plaintiffs neither
signed nor rejected this contract. However, they did indicate that they
would pay the defendant provided all of the services were performed in
accordance with these contract terms. During the project, the plaintiffs
stopped making payments. Eventually the defendant filed a demand for
arbitration pursuant to the contract. The plaintiffs requested a mediation
conference and submitted their own claim before the arbitration board
before withdrawing and claiming they were not bound to arbitration. 3 The
court reasoned that for course of conduct to act as consent to a contract,
it must be clear that the conduct relates to the specific contract in
question.'' The court concluded that plaintiff's correspondence to
defendant acknowledging the proposed contract, the request for mediation,
123. Id. at 79.
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id. at 81.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 82.
129. 172 III. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. at _, 526 N.E.2d at 606.
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and the submission of a claim to arbitration showed conduct that related
specifically to the written contract. 132
B. Scope of the Agreement
Arbitration clauses are related to contracts and principles of contract
interpretation therefore apply."3 The terms of an arbitration agreement
determine which issues will be submitted to arbitration. However, certain
issues have been preserved for judicial consideration.
Common law contract interpretation was used in Kansas Gas & Electric
Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co." The arbitration clause in question was
contained in an ownership agreement for the Jeffrey Energy Center.3 ' A
separate operating agreement authorized Kansas Power & Light [hereinafter
K.P.L.] to act as the agent for the other owners in the operation of the
facility." A dispute arose regarding the purchase of coal supplies. K.P.L.
sought to compel arbitration. 37 The trial court concluded the arbitration
clause in the ownership agreement was not incorporated into the operating
agreement because it was not referred to in the first paragraph of the
operating agreement.Is Using standard contract analysis,3 9 the court of
appeals reversed the district court and found the arbitration clause included
in the ownership agreement required arbitration of any controversy arising
out of or relating to the operating agreement."
Arbitration agreements which require submission of "any controversy"
to arbitration are interpreted as being broad and general in scope. This
gives the arbitrator the right to hear and decide nearly every dispute arising
between the contractually bound parties. However, some courts are
reluctant to allow certain causes of action to be handled through arbitration.
132. Id.
133. Frates v. Edward D. Jones & Co., _ Mont. _, 760 P.2d 748 (Mont. 1988).
134. 12 Kan. App. 2d 546, 751 P.2d 1 (1988).
135. Id. at , 751 P.2d at 147.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at -, 751 P.2d at 150.
139. The court followed the contract principle that"[u]nless the terms of a contract are
ambiguous, its meaning must be determined solely within the 'four corners' of the contract."
Id. (quoting Brown v. Lang, 234 Kan. 610, 675 P.2d 842 (1984)). Furthermore, the court
stated, "A contract is ambiguous when the words used to express the meaning and intentions
of the parties are insufficient in a sense the contract may be understood to reach two or more
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In Frates v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,' the Supreme Court of Montana,
while acknowledging that both federal and state policy favored arbitration,
affirmed a district court's denial of the defendant's motion to compel
arbitration and held that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
issue of fraud. 42 The plaintiffs filed an eight count complaint including
fraud with regard to an investment made with the defendant in a limited oil
and gas partnership.143 Noting that any ambiguity in the arbitration clause
or other aspect of the agreement must be strictly construed against the
drafter (defendant), the court found that the contract's arbitration clause was
prospective in nature, thus, making its terms inapplicable to the issue of
fraud since the contract was entered into after the purchases of the limited
partnership.'"
A similar issue arose in Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.," 5 where the
court examined whether a contract between employer and employee which
provided for arbitration includes the arbitration of torts, or whether the
adjudication of a tortious act is best addressed in the judicial arena. The
employee in this case claimed she was wrongly discharged.'4 Her union
declined to represent her claim; she then filed suit in district court for
retaliatory discharge. The district court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment which the court of appeals affirmed. 147
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding summary judgment was
inappropriate since a genuine issue of fact existed.'4 The court further
ruled that employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement who have
been wrongfully discharged contrary to state public policy can bring an
action in tort, regardless of the existence of an arbitration agreement.'49
The court explained that the right to judicial remedies for an employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement is not general in nature, but
available only to those who are discharged from employment in conflict with
state public policy. 5
141. - Mont. at _, 760 P.2d at 748.
142. Id. at _, 760 P.2d at 749.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645 (1988).
146. Id. at , 752 P.2d 646.
147. Id. at __ 752 P.2d at 647.
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In Elliott v. Inter-Insurance Exchange,"5 ' the court concluded the U.A.A.
did not control the issues to be arbitrated by the parties.' 2 Rather, the
arbitration agreement between them dictated the issues to be decided. 53
The arbitration agreement in this case provided that disputes as to the
liability or amount of damages were to be arbitrated.' In this accident
case, the defendant asserted that the other driver was not an uninsured
motorist, which was relevant to the issue of coverage.' 5 The court stated
that whether the scope of the arbitration clause reaches the issues in dispute
should be determined as early as possible and "such determination is
controlled by judicial guidelines." 15 6  The court held that under such an
agreement, the initial determination of whether the dispute is within the
scope of the agreement was to be decided by a court.'57 The court required
that it be determined whether the other driver was uninsured before
arbitration was conducted. 58
In Atkins v. Rustic Woods Partners,'59 an agreement to arbitrate any
dispute between the parties included disputes as to the fiduciary duties
between them.16 In this case, the limited partners sued the partnership and
general partners for a breach of fiduciary duty in selling real estate that was
a partnership asset.16' When defendants sought to have the dispute
submitted to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the partnership
agreements, the plaintiffs' resisted on the ground that a dispute over
fiduciary duties was not within the agreement. 62 The pertinent clause
designated "as arbitrable any dispute or disagreement between any of the
parties affecting their respective rights in this partnership." 63 The court
concluded that this clause required arbitration of the disagreement over
fiduciary duties.164 The court stated that the scope of an arbitration clause
151. 169 I1l. App. 3d 702, 523 N.E.2d 1086 (1988).
152. Id. at _, 523 N.E.2d at 1090.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Flood v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 41 111. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968).




159. 171 I11. App. 3d 373, 525 N.E.2d 551 (1988).
160. Id. at __, 525 N.E.2d at 553.
161. Id.
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should be determined by examining "both the wording of a particular clause
and the terms of the contract." 65
An agreement to arbitrate is enforceable between parties even if a
similar dispute is to be litigated between a party and an outsider.'6 In
Atkins, plaintiffs brought allegations against an attorney who was not a party
that he had breached a fiduciary duty. 6 7 The court stated that, despite the
existence of claims of third parties or multiparty ligation, the agreement to
arbitrate was still enforceable."t  However, the appellate court reversed the
order of the circuit court compelling arbitration on the separate ground that
defendant had waived its right to arbitration. 169 Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful
seizure of property was a claim for breach of contract and could properly
be arbitrated as a dispute arising out of or related to the contract. 7
In Long v. DeGeer,'7' a contract provision for arbitration of disputes
between a customer and a stockbroker was held to cover a dispute between
a customer and an agent of a stockbroker who did not sign the agreement.'2
The customer complained that the agent of the stockbroker mishandled the
account.'73 The court found that the provision was broad enough to include
any disputes based on fraud and misrepresentation as long as they were
rooted in the relationship created by the contract."'
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Woolard,75 the court stated
that coverage issues relating to an insurance policy are to be decided by the
court. 76 The trial court granted an order to compel arbitration, but was
reversed on appeal because a determination was not made as to whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover under the insurance policy.' 7  The
appellate court stated that since questions existed as to whether the alleged
tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist and the plaintiff was an insured under
165. Id. (quoting J & K Cement Constr., Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 I1. App.
3d 663, 670, 456 N.E.2d 899, 895 (1983)).





171. 753 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1988).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1328.
174. Id. at 1329 (quoting Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 119
Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. 1975)).
175. 523 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 799.
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the policy, 78 the trial court must decide the coverage questions before
referring the matter to arbitration. 79
The court in Ozite Corp. v. Upholsterers International Union"8 held that
the question of arbitrability of a dispute is for the courts to decide.'8' An
employer brought an action against the union to compel arbitration of a
dispute over whether the union induced the employer to contribute more
to a health and welfare program than other employers.In The collective
bargaining agreement between the parties mandated that any dispute
concerning interpretation, application, or administration be arbitrated.l 83
The union argued that no controversy within the meaning of the clause
existed because the rate the employer was to pay was provided for in the
contract.' The employer argued that it had understood during negotiations
that its payment to the program would be the same as that of other
contributing employers."u The court held that the employer was entitled to
an order compelling arbitration, and that the arguments of the parties
should be presented to the arbitrator and not the court.18
The court in Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Streets'
87
determined whether a disputed matter was within the scope of an arbitration
clause.'" The dispute was whether an uninsured motorist clause covered an
accident involving the insured's son.' The policy provided coverage for
relatives of the insured if they lived in the same household.'19 It also
included relatives who were minors but were temporarily residing el-
sewhere.191 The insurance company argued that the son was not a minor in
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 671 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. 111. 1987).
181. Id. at 567 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 566.
184. Id. at 568.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 856 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1988), No. 88-1045 (D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds, Dist. file).
188. Id. at 526.
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the insured's custody and was not a resident of her household.'9 The
parties also disputed the coverage limitations of the policy.1"
The court held that the dispute over residency and the policy limits was
subject to arbitration.'9 The insurance company argued that the arbitration
clause covered only disputes over the entitlement to damages from the
uninsured driver and the amount of damages."9 The court stated that the
dispute was not about the amount of damages, but rather the coverage of
the policy.19 "Whether or not the estate of Martin Streets can recover such
damages, and the amount thereof, are factual issues entirely distinct from
the question whether Martin Streets is an insured under the Metropolitan
policy."197
In Benryman v. Metropolitan Insurance Co.,'91 the court held that an
arbitration clause is to be read to avoid ambiguities.' 9 Defendant argued
the clause at issue did not apply to insurance coverage limitations but only
to whether a person is entitled to collect damages.200 The court stated that
the arbitration clause was clear in meaning and refused to create ambiguity
where none existed. 201
In Gelderman v. Mullins,' 2 the court ruled that some contract phrases
will be interpreted to meet the public policy favoring arbitration.2 3 In this
case, plaintiff brought an action against defendant for allegedly misap-
propriating a computer program developed by a broker which would be used
by the broker for business purposes connected with the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT).' Both parties to the action were members of the CBOT.M
The CBOT required all of its members to arbitrate controversies which
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 529.
195. Id. at 528.
196. Id. at 529.
197. Id.




202. 171 I1. App. 3d 255, 524 N.E.2d 1212 (1988).
203. Id. at _, 524 N.E.2d at 1215 (quoting Dierson v. Joe Kein Builders, Inc., 153 Il1.
App. 3d 373, 375, 505 N.E.2d 1325. 1327-1328 (1987)). The public policy to be served was
judicial economy and resolving disputes out of court.
204. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 1212-13.
205. Id. at _, 524 N.E.2d at 1213.
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"arise out of Exchange business of such parties."' The court gave this
language a broad interpretation. The court did not limit business to trading
on the Exchange, but ruled that business must be Exchange related. 2 7 The
court concluded the program was Exchange related because it was developed
for Exchange use.'
One court has construed an arbitration provision narrowly in a limited
partnership agreement which limited arbitrable issues to those affecting
"general policy" of the company. In United Cable Television v. Northwest
Illinois Cable,0 9 the three disputes involved: 1) amount of profits to be
distributed and/or profits to be retained; 2) proper allocation of investment
tax credit; 3) maintenance of partnership funds in an account which did not
bear interest.20 The parties did not define "general policy" in the contract
so the court had to supply the definition.21' The court stated that the claim
was not arbitrable since the parties intended the provision to apply only to
issues arising out of the decision making process as to the course of conduct
to be taken by the company with regard to ongoing and future operations."2
Thus, the arbitration provision was not applicable to disputes over
distribution of profits, allocation of investment tax credits, or the holding
partnership funds in non-interest bearing accounts.213
C. Effects of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In City of Bismarck v. Toltz, King, Duvall, Anderson & Associates, Inc.,214
the plaintiff sought damages on the same issue it had previously arbitrated
with another party to the dispute. The lawsuit filed against a contractor, its
surety, and an engineering firm centered around the substandard construc-
tion of a sewer system for Bismarck.
First, the city arbitrated its dispute with the contractor. 215 After lengthy
arbitration, each party was awarded damages. Pursuant to a stipulation that
the contractor and its surety would be dismissed from the lawsuit, the city
206. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 1215 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade Rule 600).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 162 Ill. App. 3d 411, 515 N.E.2d 401 (1987).
210. Id. at __, 515 N.E.2d at 402.
211. Id.
212. Id. at , 515 N.E.2d at 403.
213. Id.
214. 855 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1988).
215. Id. at 582.
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agreed to pay the difference of the two awards to the contractor. 216
Immediately thereafter, the city amended its complaint against the
engineering firm to increase the amount of damages and added additional
theories of liability.217
In affirming the lower court's holding that the city was collaterally
estopped from seeking damages from the engineering firm in court after the
city had won damages against the contractor in arbitration, the court of
appeals outlined a four point test to be used when applying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.218
[Tihe use of collateral estoppel is appropriate when: 1) the issue is
identical to one in a prior adjudication; 2) there was a final judgment
on the merits; 3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication; and 4) the estopped party was given a
full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.219
Under this four prong test, the court found that the city had received
adequate remedies and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the amount
of damages in the arbitration hearing z2
In Beckman v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co.,"n another court reached
a similar result by different means. The issue was whether a union
employee was prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing an
action in a circuit court for retaliatory discharge. The employee's union had
previously filed a grievance on her behalf with an industrial arbitration
board which was subsequently denied. The circuit court held that the
arbitrator's decision that the employee was discharged for "just cause"
precluded her from bringing an action in the circuit court.' The court of
appeals reversed, finding that the employee did not place the issue of
retaliatory discharge before the arbitration board, and therefore, had a right
to adjudicate the claim.' 3
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. This test was initially used by the court in ARKLA v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.,
734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1984).
219. City of Bismark, 855 F.2d at 582 (quoting ARKLA, 734 F.2d at 356).
220. Id. at 583.
221. 123 Iil. 2d 281, 527 N.E.2d 303 (1988).
222. Id. at __,527 N.E.2d at 303.
223. Id. at __,527 N.E.2d at 305.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the judgment of the circuit court." The supreme court, however,
did not apply the doctrine of res judicata. Instead, the court reinstated the
circuit court decision on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action, thus aligning itself with the industrial arbitration board's finding
that the employee was discharged for "just cause."1-s
In Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authoriezy the court held
that an arbitrator is not collaterally estopped from deciding an issue where
an injunction was sought in a prior judicial proceeding in which the court
stated it was not ruling on the issue. 7 The defendant argued for collateral
estoppel on the issue of liability for seizure of plaintiffs equipment where
plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought an injunction.' The court stated that
the breach of contract issue was not decided in the injunction action, and
therefore, the arbitrator was not precluded from addressing that point.229
In re Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc.23° held that absent specific
language precluding arbitration on an issue, the agreement between the
parties to arbitrate is binding. 231 The defendant argued that the language
of the contract gave it the right to make personnel selection decisions. 32
The court held that the specific provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement at issue did not preserve for the defendant the right to make
such decisions, and that the dispute was subject to arbitration. 33
Res judicata and collateral estoppel can bar claims that could have
originally been heard by an arbitrator. In Board of Governors v. Education
Labor Relations Board,' Northeastern Illinois University filed charges to
discharge a teacher, and thereafter, the teacher filed a grievance with the
University. The University informed her that her only option was to appeal
her discharge through the Merit Board, which she did. However, midway
through the hearing, her attorney discovered that she had filed a grievance
with the University. When the attorney moved to terminate the hearing so
that his client could pursue her option under the University's collective
224. Id. at __ 527 N.E.2d at 307.
225. Id. at , 527 N.E.2d at 305.
226. 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122 (1988).
227. Id. at _, 751 P.2d at 129.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 414 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
231. Id. at 457.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. _ Il1. App. 3d _, 524 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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bargaining agreement, the Merit Board refused.235 The Board also ruled that
the dismissal of the teacher was valid. The teacher attempted to submit her
claim to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. However, the court was not sympathetic and ruled
that since the teacher did not appeal the Merit Board's ruling, the Board's
judgment became final.?
In general, most courts adhere to the strong public policy favoring
arbitration either from the policy standpoint of curtailing the rising wave of
litigation or to effectuate the intent to have an alternative means of dispute
resolution. While courts will not extend the policy favoring arbitration to
disputes that clearly were not intended to be covered by an arbitration
agreement, this policy seems to have fostered many decisions which compel
arbitration where the manifestation of assent to arbitrate was not clear from
the parties' agreement. Nothing in the aforementioned cases indicates a
reversal of this trend.
IV. COMPELLING OR STAYING ARBITRATION
In deciding whether to compel or stay arbitration, a court looks only at
whether the dispute is arbitrable; not at the merits of the case.237 If the
dispute is arbitrable, a court must submit the case to arbitration. 2M
Arbitration can dispense with many cases and clear court dockets of the
ever rising number of claims submitted.2 39 However, without a means to
compel arbitration when an agreement has been made to arbitrate, this
purpose is lost.' 4
In Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects International-Chicago,241 the
defendant prepared contracts for the plaintiff to sign. The contracts
contained an arbitration provision.242 However, the plaintiff never signed the
contracts and denied it was bound by them. Both the trial and appellate
courts ordered submission to arbitration. 23 Each court ruled as a matter of
law that plaintiff's actions showed the existence of a valid contract which
235. Id. at 759.
236. Id. at 770.
237. See Recent Developments 1985: 1985 Mo. J. DiSP. RES. at 193.
238. See Sanitary Sewer Auth. v. Dial Assocs. Constr. Group, Inc., 367 Pa. Super. 207, 532
A.2d. 862, 863 (1987).
239. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 1053.
241. 172 II1. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (1988).
242. Id. at __ 526 N.E.2d at 604.
243. Id. at _,526 N.E. at 603.
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included arbitration provisions, even though the document was not signed.2"
The appellate court concluded that "[w]hen a party denies the existence
of an agreement to arbitrate, section 2(b) of the Uniform Arbitration Act
(Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, para. 102(b) (1985)), requires that the court, upon
application of a party, determine the question of arbitrability as a matter of
law." 45 The court further noted that "[iun such a proceeding the court is
not to consider the merits of the issue, but must summarily determine
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. If the court finds that such an
agreement exists, it should order arbitration; if not, then it should stay
arbitration."2 s The court found that a contract was formed on the basis of
plaintiffs' actions, and thus, the arbitration provision should be summarily
compelled.'47
Texas courts appear to share the position taken by the Illinois courts.
In Wetzel v. Sullivan, King & Sabom,2" the issue involved the value of a
former shareholder's stock in a firm and the allocation of fees in certain
contingent fee cases. The plaintiff shareholder filed for arbitration pursuant
to an arbitration agreement. The trial court granted injunctive relief to
prohibit arbitration of the issues in dispute. The court reasoned that the
arbitration agreement did not meet the requirements of Article 224-1 of the
Texas General Arbitration Act in that the agreements were not signed by
the president and other key members of the firm.249 Thus, the trial court
found no agreement and granted a stay of arbitration."5 °
The appellate court reversed and stated that "[e]ven if a written
agreement is not executed and no writing exists that satisfies the Texas
General Arbitration Act, a common law right to arbitration is enforceable
if an appropriate agreement to submit to arbitration is shown.""1 As in
Landmark,z2 the Wetzel court found there was a valid agreement under
common law principles. 3 The court found that the defendant's actions
244. Id. at ,526 N.E.2d at 606.
245. Id. at 381, 526 N.E.2d at 605 (quoting Donaldson v. Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc.,
151 Ill. App. 3d 597, 503 N.E.2d 786 (1987)).
246. Id. (quoting Gelderman, Inc. v. Mullins, 171 III. App. 3d 255, 524 N.E.2d 1212
(1988)).
247. Id. at _, 526 N.E.2d at 603.
248. 745 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
249. Id. at 80 (construing TEX. Rev. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
250. Id. at 78.
251. Id. at 81.
252. Landmark, 172 Iii. App. 3d at 379, 526 N.E.2d at 603.
253. Wetzel, 745 S.W.2d at 78.
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revealed the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate,"4 and additionally
held that the defendant would be "estopped from denying the existence of
the agreement because it ratified the agreements as a matter of law." "
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Higgins,"6 the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies did not cause the court to compel arbitration. The
personnel rules for "classified" employees required employee disputes to be
processed through a specific grievance procedure, beginning with an appeal
to the agency and then to the mayor, and ending with the employee having
the option of submitting the issue to binding arbitration 57 Higgins, the
employee, was reclassified from a "classified" to an "executive" municipal
employee 2s' by the mayor of Anchorage, but Higgins disputed the reclas-
sification on the grounds that the mayor had failed to comply with the
procedural process required for reclassification.759
Rather than submitting to the binding arbitration procedures as required
by the personnel rules, Higgins filed suit against the municipality because
he felt arbitration would not offer him adequate protection since his dispute
was against the same individuals responsible for hearing the grievance.m
The Alaska Municipal Code provided that an employee may dispense with
administrative remedies "where the administrative remedy is inadequate or
where the pursuit of the administrative remedy would be futile due to the
certainty of an adverse decision."261 The appellate court held that Higgins
failed to show that submission of the claim to arbitration would have been
"futile". Higgins suggests that if an Anchorage municipal employee can
prove that submitting his case to arbitration would be "futile", a court
cannot compel arbitration. The employee is then able to sue the municipal-
ity without following the normal grievance process provided for in the
personnel rules.
In Gelderman, Inc. v Mullins,' the court compelled arbitration even
though the controversy was not wholly within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. Plaintiff, a member of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT),
filed suit against a former employee who was a futures commission merchant
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 754 P.2d. 745 (Alaska 1988).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 746.
259. Id. at 747.
260. Id. at 746.
261. Id. at 747 (quoting Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 181 (Alaska 1982)).
262. 171 III. App. 3d 255, 524 N.E.2d 1212 (1988).
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and the former employee's employer.' Defendants' filed a motion to stay
litigation and to compel arbitration based on CBOT Rule 600.2" At trial,
the existence of an arbitration provision was undisputed. However, the trial
court denied the motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration because
the "controversy arose from business that was only 90% Exchange-related." 65
The appellate court reversed the denial of a stay of proceedings and the
denial to compel arbitration ruling that the controversy fell within the scope
of the arbitration agreement, although not squarely.' The court reasoned
as follows:
[t]he object of arbitration is to foster the final disposition of
disputes in an easier, faster, and more economical manner than by
litigation. . . .Moreover, where the issues and relationships are
sufficiently interrelated and the result of arbitration may be to
eliminate the need for court proceedings, submission of the dispute
to arbitration meets the goals of judicial economy and of resolving
disputes outside of the judicial forum. 67
The court concluded that "[tihe fact that approximately 10% of the business
[on which the plaintiff based its claim] was outside of the arbitration
agreement should not defeat the policy favoring arbitration. " '
Even if an agreement is shown to exist, unique factual situations may
require the court to adopt special standards to arrive at a decision. In Long
v. DeGeer,m a stockbroker was sued by a customer. The stockbroker sought
to compel arbitration of the complaint pursuant to an arbitration agreement
signed by the plaintiff and the brokerage firm, but not signed by the
stockbroker.2 T Plaintiff argued that since the stockbroker was merely a
nonsignatory agent that he "should not be given the benefits of the
arbitration provisions."2 71
263. Id. at __ 524 N.E.2d 1213.
264. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 1214-15. Rule 600 states in part, "[any controversy between
parties who are members and which arises out of the Exchange business of such parties shall,
at the request of any such party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Board." Id. (quoting Rule 600).
265. Id at 524 N.E.2d at 1214.
266. Id. at _, 524 N.E. at 1216.
267. Id. (citing Dierson v. Joe Klein Builders, Inc., 153 I11. App. 3d 373, 375, 505 N.E.2d
1325, 1327-28 (1987) (and cases cited therein)).
268. Id.
269. 753 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1987), reh'g denied 753 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1988).
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The question for the court was whether "the nonsignatory agent
handling matters within the scope of the arbitration agreement should be
allowed to bring questions concerning those matters into arbitration under
the agreement."272 The court found that this question "has been consistently
answered in the affirmative."273 The court noted that plaintiff many times
recognized the stockbroker as an agent of the firm.274 Given this and the
fact that defendant's "actions . . . clearly arose out of the existence of the
relationship created by the securities account agreement, the dispute
regarding those actions was within the scope of the agreement to ar-
bitrate. '2 75 In light of a valid agreement to arbitrate and an action falling
within this agreement, the court issued an order compelling arbitration. 6
In Paine Webber, Inc. v. Farnam,277 the appellate court denied Paine
Webber's request for a stay of arbitration of customer disputes pending
appeal for failing to show undue delay and "irreparable injury."278 Paine
Webber's securities agreements provided for disputes between the company
and its stockholders to be settled by arbitration.2" The district court
compelled arbitration of certain customer disputes, but Paine Webber was
in the process of appealing the district court's decision.M
Although the appellate court acknowledged that preventing a stay of
arbitration might result in arbitration ending before resolution of the
appeal, "the ordinary incidents of litigating [time, energy, and money] (or
arbitrating) a case are not 'irreparable injury.'"2 1 The court further noted
that "even a strong likelihood of reversal is not enough to get a stay of
arbitration pending appeal."' The court concluded that the principles of
speed and cost-saving afforded by arbitration outweighed plaintiff's
contentions.m
272. Id. at 1329.
273. Id. (including numerous cases cited therein).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1330.
277. 843 F.2d. 1050 (7th Cir. 1988).
278. Id. at 1051.
279. Id. at 1052.
280. Id. at 1050.
281. Id. at 1051 (citing Graphic Communications Union v. Chicago Tribune Co., 779 F.2d.
1315 (7th Cir. 1985)).
282. Id. at 1052 (citing Graphic Communications, 779 F.2d at 1315).
283. Id. at 1053.
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Arbitration will not be compelled when the claim set forth does not fall
within the arbitration clause. In Frates v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,m
respondent filed various claims against defendant relating to securities
transactions which took place before her husband's death. The respondent's
broker moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a Full Service Account
Customer Loan Agreement and Loan Consent signed by respondent after
her husband's death. The court stated that this "clearly refers to future
transactions and not those occurring prior to the date of the agreement. "2
The court justified its power to determine this by stating that "arbitration
clauses are creatures of contract, and therefore, principles of contract
interpretation are applicable."6 7 Given that the claims are outside the
arbitration clause, the court deemed it correct for the lower court to deny
the motion to compel arbitration.28
Three cases recently employed a "positive assurance" test in determining
whether to compel or stay arbitration. Izzo v. AT&T Communications, Inc.2
concluded that an employee who had been prevented from pursuing all
contractual remedies due to the union's resistance to hear the complaint
was entitled to have the claims heard in federal court.3 The court
acknowledged that the issues of transfer, promotion, and discharge were
arbitrable claims within the collective bargaining agreement and should not
normally be released from arbitration "unless it may be said with 'positive
assurance' that the arbitration clause"2 ' does not cover the asserted dispute.
However, the court concluded that the history of collaboration between the
company and the unions would jeopardize the employee's rights if the
claims were submitted to arbitration. Furthermore, the failure of the
union to agree to arbitrate until two years had passed was not in com-
pliance with the Illinois arbitration act which required suits to be submitted
to arbitration "as soon as practicable."'
284. 760 P.2d 748 (Mont. 1988).
285. Id. at 750. Paragraph 17 of this agreement states in part, "[tlhis agreement shall
cover all accounts which the undersigned may open or reopen with you. Id.
286. Id. at 751.
287. Id. at 752.
288. Id.





293. Id. at. (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 para. 20 (1985)).
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In Ozite Corp. v. Upholsterers International Union,2 the court concluded
that an arbitration clause in a contract creates a presumption in favor of
arbitrability, and "'[ain order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute.' "29 The plaintiff claimed that defendant failed to pay proper
contribution rates into a health and welfare program and the parties
disputed the collective bargaining agreement itself which mandated that
"'any controversy concerning the interpretation, application, or administra-
tion' of the agreement be submitted to grievance and arbitration proceed-
ings."2 Although the defendant acknowledged the existence of the
agreement, it said that there was no controversy because the issue of
contribution rates were specified in the bargaining agreement.29 However,
the court found that Ozite agreed to the rate provision only because it
assumed the defendant would be subject to an equal rate, thus, creating a
proper controversy for arbitration because the "sole provision in the contract
relating to a default in health and welfare program contributions makes
reference to arbitration."2
Sanitary Sewer Authority v. Dial Associates Construction Group, Inc.,Z" is
another case which employed the "positive assurance" test in overturning the
trial court's grant of a stay of arbitration.300 A contract between two parties
called for the defendant to construct two sewer lines for the plaintiff in
exchange for approximately $670,000.1 A provision in the contract stated
that "[all claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or
relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof . . shall be decided in
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules."' Plaintiff
brought an action for breach of the contract and filed for arbitration. The
294. 671 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. III. 1987).
295. Id. at 567-68 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)).
296. Id. at 566.
297. Id. at 568.
298. Id.
299. 367 Pa. Super. 207, 532 .2d. 862 (1987).
300. The court stated, "[i]n accordance with the general policy favoring arbitration of
contractual differences, an order enjoining arbitration of a particular grievance should not be
granted unless it can be said with positive assurance that the agreement involved is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Id. at _, 532 A.2d. at 863-
64 (quoting Wolf v. Baltimore, 250 Pa. Super. 230, 234, 378 A.2d 911, 912 (1977)).
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trial court denied arbitration as it concluded the real issue was its jurisdic-
tion once the case had been filed.3
The appellate court held that not only was the trial court mistaken in
failing to determine whether the dispute involved was covered by the
arbitration clause, but also that the jurisdictional issue was irrelevant to the
question of whether arbitration should be stayed.' The court concluded
that, "[t]he parties agreed that all claims arising out of the contract would
be subject to arbitration. Clearly, the dispute which is the subject of the
arbitration matter, alleging a breach of the contract, is covered by the broad
language of the arbitration provision."
Uniform principles to guide the courts in decisions to compel or stay
arbitration are essential. However, judicial discretion must also be exercised
to promote the policy favoring arbitration. A major factor considered by
the court is the language of the clause and the intent of the parties.
Therefore, the parties should carefully construct their arbitration agreements
to prevent litigating the issue of arbitrability.
V. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
Sections 11 & 12 of the U.A.A. deal with the issue of whether a court
should confirm or vacate an existing arbitration award. The importance of
these provisions is obvious: they allow an avenue for correctly arbitrated
awards to stand while providing a method for vacating awards which are in
some respect faulty. These sections provide the necessary pragmatic link
from judicial principles of "fairness" and "justice" to the implementation of
arbitration awards grounded in sound legal reasoning.
A. Arbitrator Misconduct, Partiality, and Bias
Section 12(a)(2) of the U.A.A. provides that an award of the arbitrator
may be vacated upon showing of partiality or misconduct prejudicing the
right of any party. However, showing misconduct which will rise to a level
sufficient to set aside or vacate an arbitration award places a heavy burden
on the party offering the proof.
A case illustrative of this burden is Goeller v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.3 6 A member of the arbitration panel had written a letter of protest to
the arbitration board saying that his vote in the original arbitration was
303. Id. at -, 532 A.2d. at 864.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 532 A-2d. at 865.
306. 376 Pa. Super. 608, 546 A.2d 690 (1988).
[Vol. 1989
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listed incorrectly, and that he thought the other two arbitrators had
discussed the case outside of his presence. 3 7 The appeals court reversed the
trial court's vacation of the arbitration award. The court stated that the
appellants must show by clear, precise, and indubitable evidence that they
were denied a hearing, or that fraud, misconduct, or other irregularity
caused the entry of an unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable award.3w The
appellee alleged that when an arbitrator submitted a bill for arbitration
during a time that the award was under contest, this was misconduct which
the court should vacate.3 9 The court concluded that the sending of a bill
for a disputed proceeding was not clear and convincing evidence of
misconduct sufficient to vacate.310
In Egan & Sons Co. v. Mears Park Development Co. ,311 the arbitrator had
previously been in an attorney-client relationship with a general partner of
Mears Park prior to the arbitration proceedings. When the arbitrator
determined the award for Mears Park, Egan asked the district court to
vacate the award on grounds of evident partiality by the arbitrator.312 The
district court vacated the award. The appellate court cited cases that
interpreted Minnesota law to require vacation of an award if there was
evidence of dealings that might create the impression of bias and held that
a previous attorney-client relationship was sufficient evidence of partiality
to vacate the award.313
In Hahn v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc.,34 the court held that an ex parte
communication by the arbitrator with one of the parties raised the
presumption that the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or other
undue means and thus necessitated vacating the award. 315 The defendant
argued that only that portion of the award affected by the ex parte
communication should be vacated, but the court held that the arbitrator's
actions tainted the whole process and therefore required vacation of the
entire award.31 6
307. Id. at , 546 A.2d at 691.
308. Id. at , 546 A.2d at 692.
309. Id. at _, 546 A.2d at 691.
310. Id. at __, 5465 A.2d at 692.
311. 414 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 786 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393
U.S. 145 (1968)).
314. __ III. App. 3d _, 518 N.E.2d 218,223 (1987).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 225-26.
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In Howerin Residential Sales Corp. v. Century Realty of Tidewater, Inc. ,31
the plaintiff filed for arbitration with another realty company over payment
of a commission. The arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff, and the
defendant refused to pay citing arbitrator misconduct.318 The alleged
misconduct involved the arbitrator stating to the respondent during the
arbitration proceeding that respondents would be "kicked off the Board of
Realtors" should they not submit to arbitration.39  The arbitration award
was vacated by the trial court, and on appeal, the issue was the question of
the arbitrator's misconduct.320 The Virginia Supreme Court held that this
threat was not misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, since submission to
arbitration of any claim between Board of Realtors members was a
precondition to being a member.321 As a result, the court reinstated the
arbitration award.' 2
B. The Arbitrator's Scope of Authority
The scope of the arbitrator's authority to decide issues submitted to
arbitration is broad. 323 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has stated that
"a dispute is only outside an arbitration clause if it can be said with a
positive assurance that the clause never intended to encompass such a
situation."324 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held that the
decision of an arbitrator will not be overturned if it draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement.3 5
In Johnson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 326 the issue was
whether an arbitration panel exceeded its authority by interpreting the
Minnesota no-fault insurance statutes.32' The court held that statutory
interpretation of the no-fault insurance statute was properly an area
reserved for judicial proceedings, and that an arbitration panel's statutory
317. 235 Va. 174, 365 S.E.2d 767 (Va. 1988).
318. Id. at _, 365 S.E.2d at 769.
319. Id. at _, 365 S.E.2d at 770.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at , 365 S.E.2d 771.
323. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988) (en
banc).
324. See Hade v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 Pa. 227, 546 A.2d 615 (1988).
325. See Wilkes-Barre Area Educ. Assoc. v. Wilkes-Barre Area School Dist., 113 Pa 492,
538 A.2d 81 (1988).
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interpretation clearly exceeded its authority under Minnesota's Uniform
Arbitration Act.a~ In vacating the award, the court further held that since
the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority, the arbitration decision
was reviewable de novo.329
In another Minnesota case, Franke v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.,33 the court was faced with the question of what constitutes arbitrator
partiality under Minnesota's Uniform Arbitration Act.33t Each side was to
pick an arbitrator for the panel, and the court was to appoint a neutral
arbitrator.332 The award was appealed based on an alleged relationship
between respondent's attorney and respondent's arbitrator which the
appellant argued was evident partiality.333 The court affirmed the arbitration
award and held that only the neutral arbitrator could be held accountable
for partiality and to hold otherwise would not be in accord with having
each side choose their own arbitrator. 34
In E.D.S. Construction Co. v. North End Health Center, Inc. ,33s a
contractor did not meet the deadline for finishing construction and a
damage claim was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators awarded
liquidated damages to the Health Center in accordance with the contract,
and the contractor petitioned the court to vacate the award on the grounds
that it was outside the scope of authority of the arbitrator.'- The contrac-
tor argued that the arbitrator's reference in his decision to the liquidated
damages clause as a "penalty clause" made the award outside the scope of
the arbitrator's authority.37 The court held that a mere reference in the
award creating an ambiguity would not permit the inference that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority.38
In the case of Grobert File Co., Inc. v. RTC Systems, 339 RTC challenged
the arbitrator's authority to grant an award that RTC claimed was expressly
328. Id. at 421.
329. Id. at 419.
330. 421 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 407.
333. Id. at 408.
334. Id. at 409-10.
335. 412 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
336. Id. at 785.
337. 1d. at 786.
338. Id The court quoted with approval from Hilltop Constr., Inc. v. Lou Park
Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1982) which states, "[al mere ambiguity in the opinion
accompanying an award which permits an inference that the arbitrators may have exceeded their
authority is no reason for refusing to enforce the award."
339. 524 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
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precluded by the terms of the contract. 340 The court agreed that an
arbitrator may not ignore plain language of a contract and award relief that
is clearly beyond the marked boundaries of that contract.mt However, when
the language of a contract was subject to interpretation, as in this case, it
is clearly within the arbitrator's scope of authority to interpret the language
and grant an award within that interpretation.42
In Adler v. Safeco Insurance Co.,343 the arbitrators modified an award at
Safeco's request by deleting the portion that would require the company to
pay prejudgment interest to Adler.?" On appeal, the court vacated the
"reviewed" award and confirmed the original prejudgment interest award.34'
The appeals court noted that the arbitrators are allowed to change an award
only if clarification or correction of an obvious miscalculation in figures is
necessary. 34 By changing the substance of the award, the arbitrators had
exceeded their authority, which gave the district court power to vacate the
award. 47 Therefore, the court held that the "reviewed" award was properly
vacated and the original award was confirmed.'
C. Refusal to Hear Evidence Material to the Controversy
A court can vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator refuses to hear
evidence material to the controversy. 9 In Wayne Insulation Co., Inc. v. Hex
Corp.,350 an action was filed to vacate an arbitration award on grounds that
the arbitrators had erroneously refused to hear evidence of a settlement
offer made by one of the parties. 35' The court noted that the arbitrators
340. Id.
341. Id. at 406.
342. Id. at 407.
343. 413 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
344. Id. at 567. The pertinent Minnesota statute has been interpreted by Minnesota courts
to mean that arbitrators cannot award prejudgment interest. See Lucas v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 403 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1987) (construing MINN. STAT. § 549.09.1(b)(6) (1986)).
345. Alder, 413 N.W.2d at 569.
346. Id. at 568 (construing MINN. STAT. § 572.16 (1986)).
347. Alder, 413 N.W.2d at 569, Minnesota Statute § 572.19.1(3) provides "Upon application
of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: . .. (3) The arbitrators exceeded their
powers..
348. Alder, 413 N.W.2d at 569.
349. See U.A.A. § 12(a)(4) which provides, " Vacating an award. (a) Upon application of
a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (4) The arbitrators refused to ... hear evidence
material to the controversy ... as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party."
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were not bound by formal rules of evidence but were free to conform to
them. 52 The court held that evidence of a settlement offer was not
admissible as to liability and therefore was not material. 353 The arbitrators
made no error in excluding the evidence, and the award was properly
confirmed by the lower court.
354
In Wildwoods of Lake Johnson Associates v. L.P. COx Co.,355 the issue
was whether the arbitrator's actions rose to the level of a refusal to hear
evidence under the North Carolina statute.356 The court found that the
continuous comments and sarcastic remarks by the arbitration panel and
panel impatience and unprofessionalism toward the witnesses resulted in
some witnesses becoming intimidated and apologetic for testifying.35 7 The
court held these actions rose to the level of excluding evidence and vacated
the arbitration award.358
D. Errors of Fact or Law
It is an established principle of the U.A.A. that an error of fact or law
is not grounds for vacation of an arbitration award. 35 9 In Gruman v.
Hendrickson,' the court was asked to rule on whether the trial court erred
in refusing to vacate an arbitration award given the deference afforded
arbitrators under Minnesota law.3" Appellant insurance company claimed
that it should have been allowed to intervene as a matter of right when its
subrogation right did not mature. 36' The court, in affirming the trial court's
decision, concluded that only those grounds statutorily listed were grounds
for vacating an arbitration award and not because the court disagrees with
the decision on the merits. 63
352. Id. at 1281.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. 88 N.C. App. 88, 362 S.E.2d 615 (1987).
356. Id. at _, 362 S.E.2d at 617. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.6 (2) (1983) state "Hearing.
Unless otherwise provided by the agreement: .. . (2) The parties are entitled to be heard, to
present evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the
hearing."
357. Id. at __, 362 S.E.2d at 618.
358. Id. at __, 362 S.E.2d at 619.
359. See U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
360. 416 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
361. Id. at 499. See MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (1986).
362. 416 N.W.2d at 500.
363. Id. at 502.
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In Arkansas Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc.,3
the court considered the issue of whether mistakes of law or fact by an
arbitration panel are grounds under Arkansas law for vacating an arbitration
award.' The general rule set down by the Arkansas law is that a court will
not disturb mistakes of law and fact made by the arbitrator." The idea
underlying the rule is to discourage a party to an arbitration proceeding
from waiting until an award is made, and then complaining about something
that could have been questioned or discovered during the arbitration
process.-6 7 The court adhered to the general rule and refused to vacate the
arbitration award. 3m
In Kalish v. Illinois Educational Association, 9 Kalish and the Association
disputed payments under a temporary disability benefit plan and the issue
went to arbitration. The award was for the Association, and Kalish filed a
motion with the arbitrator to reconsider both the merits and the award.7
Shortly thereafter, Kalish received a bill from the arbitrator and immediately
filed a motion for the district court to stay the award, claiming the
arbitrator made errors in law and fact.371 The district court stayed Kalish's
motion and he appealed.372 On appeal, the court stated that when two
parties agree to arbitrate, issues of both fact and law necessary to the
arbitrator's decision are within the arbitrator's authority.373  The court
concluded that a mere error of fact or law made by the arbitrator is not
sufficient grounds to vacate an award.374
The court in Noriega v. Schnurmacher Holding, Inc.375 decided the issue
of whether the fact that both the arbitrator and the trial court misapplied
a statute requiring a tenant to pay sales tax provided grounds for reversal
as a matter of law, notwithstanding absence of statutorily enumerated
grounds for vacating an arbitration award.376 The Florida statute states that
364. 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988).
365. Id. at 256, 743 S.W.2d at 390. See AR- STAT. ANN. § 16-108-212(a)(5) (1987).
366. 294 Ark. at 260, 743 S.W.2d at 391 (construing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-108-212(a) (5).
367. Id. at 261, 743 S.W.2d at 392.
368. Id.
369. 166 Ill. App. 3d 406, 519 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
370. Id. at _, 519 N.E.2d at 1032.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at , 519 N.E.2d at 1033.
374. Id. at , 519 N.E.2d at 1032.
375. 528 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
376. Id. at 30.
38
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errors of law or fact are not grounds for reversible error.3" However, the
court reversed the trial court and vacated the arbitration award, holding that
misapplication of a statute constituted grounds for reversal and vacation as
a matter of law.37
E. Validity of an Award
An analysis commonly used by courts in deciding whether to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award is the validity of that award. In Allen v.
McCall,379 the only issue presented the trial court was whether lack of notice
was a ground for vacation of an arbitration award. The court noted that
the arbitration panel never considered the lack of notice claim. 380 The court
further held that the issue of whether a party received sufficient notice was
one to be resolved in the arbitration proceeding itself, and the fact that the
panel never considered the issue made the award invalid and was ground for
vacation of the award.38
In Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co.,' the issue
presented was whether a trial de novo clause in an arbitration agreement
could be exercised to prevent confirmation of an award in excess of the
state statutory minimum for bodily injuries under Minnesota's financial
377. Id. FLA. STAT. § 682.13(1) (a-e) (19) states:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award when:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.
(b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party.
(c) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction exceeded
their powers.
(d) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction refused
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of § 682.06, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
(e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law,
unless the matter was determined in proceedings under § 682.03 and unless
the party participated in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection.
However, the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award under the statute.
378. Noriega, 528 So. 2d at 31.
379. 521 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
380. Id. at 183.
381. Id.
382. 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1987).
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responsibility law.3 A provision in the arbitration agreement allowed either
party the right to a trial de novo only if the arbitrator's award was over the
statutory minimum.' The insurer sought to exercise its right to the trial
de novo while the insured sought confirmation of the arbitrator's award. 385
The court initially noted that Minnesota has a strong state policy of
encouraging and furthering arbitration. 38 The court then cited several
reasons for holding that the trial de novo clause was invalid.397 First, the
trial de novo provision thwarts the goals of arbitration of providing a
speedy, informal, and inexpensive forum for resolving controversies between
contracting parties.3 Second, the trial de novo provision operates to defeat
goals designed to promote judicial economy and respect for the judicial
system.389 Third, the insurance policy possesses some characteristics of an
adhesion contract in that the trial de novo provision lacks mutuality of
remedy, and was entered into between parties with unequal bargaining
power with little or no opportunity for an arms length transaction.390
F. Collateral Proceedings
A common problem facing arbitration proceedings and the courts which
review them is the consequence or effect of contemporaneous judicial or
arbitration proceeding. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc. ,391 the
court held that when an arbitrator is empowered by contract to determine
the parties interests, the court shall not actually or constructively vacate or
otherwise supersede that award.3' Arco filed a suit seeking money damages
for "lost equity" from Phillips based allegations of wrongful manipulation of
the arbitration process.393 In order to determine the amount of "lost equity"
due Arco, the court would have to calculate the "HPV" value, but the
contract clearly stated that the arbitration panel would be the only








391. No. CIV A 7177 (Del. Ch. June 14, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, Delaware
cases file) (1988 W.L. 60380).
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determiners of any disputed "HPV" values.3" If the court allowed this suit,
as a practical matter it would have had the effect of vacating the previous
arbitration award. The court refused to disturb the award and concluded
that to do so would be contrary to the policy that arbitration should be a
final determination.39
G. Vacation Based on Nonstatutory Grounds
Occasionally, a court will vacate an arbitration award based on grounds
outside the arbitration statutes. The most common reason cited by the
courts has been on grounds of public policy. However, in District School
Board of St. John's County v. Timnoney,396 the trial court neither confirmed
nor vacated an award. The trial court declared the arbitrators' award a
"nullity" as it concluded the award "lent little or no guidance to the court
for a judicial ruling," and the award was not based on substantial or
competent evidence."397 The trial court refused to confirm the award and
held the petitioner could proceed with a trial on the merits.39 The court
of appeals quashed the order of the trial court.399 The court concluded that
a trial on the merits was not available to the parties as they had agreed to
arbitrate.00 The only proper remedy available to the trial court by statute
was to remand the case to the arbitrators for reconsideration. 40 1
H. Arbitration Panel's Jurisdiction
A person who voluntarily submits an issue to arbitration is precluded
from challenging the arbitration panel's jurisdiction to decide the ques-
tion. In Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis,4 3 one of the
parties to a dispute insisted on arbitration.4 When the decision was not
as he wanted, he appealed, challenging the authority of the arbitration
394. Id. at _-
395. Id. at.
396. 524 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
397. Id. at 1130.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1131.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 268.
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panel . ' The court stated that "the authority of the arbitrators, unlike that
of a court, [is] rooted in the parties' consent."4 This holding was necessary
to be consistent with the law of arbitration and its commitment to speedy
resolution of disputes.f 7
The underlying premise upon which U.A.A. Sections 11 & 12 is based
is that the judiciary must act as a final "referee" in deciding whether an
arbitration award is confirmed or vacated. However, these sections also
clearly indicate the statutory preference for confirmation rather than
vacation of an award. This analysis underscores the legislative desire that
the arbitration process be utilized to its fullest extent and that the judiciary
should only intervene as a last resort, and then only in limited circumstan-
ces. As a result, the courts are supportive of the arbitration process and
usually only overturn awards clearly the result of fraud, bias, corruption,
failure to hear relevant evidence material to the controversy, or if the award
is outside the arbitrator's broad scope of authority. Both the legislative and
judicial activity in most jurisdictions indicate that public policy concerns
clearly support arbitration as a valuable alternative to judicial resolution of
disputes.
VI. MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARDS
Since the purpose of arbitration is to provide a relatively quick and
inexpensive way to resolve disputes, arbitrators may modify awards only in
special circumstances. 4' Likewise, judicial review of arbitration awards is
limited.'
U.A.A. Section 9 provides for modification or correction by arbitrators
in cases of evident miscalculation or evident mistake in description,
imperfection in a matter of form which does not affect the merits, and when
necessary to clarify an award.
U.A-A. Section 13 provides for modification or correction by courts in
instances of evident miscalculation of figures or evident mistake in
description, imperfection in a matter of form which does not affect merits,
and an award on a matter not submitted.
405. Id. at 269.
406. Id. at 268 (quoting Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964),
cer. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965)).
407. Id. at 269.
408. See Ciampa v. Chubb Group, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 941, _, 525 N.E.2d 1344, 1344
(1988).
409. See Lorenzini v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 753 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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Some states allow modification only in the instances set out in the
U.A.A. modification provisions.410 At least one state also allows modifica-
tion under an instance set out in the U.AA. vacation provision."' In
addition, one state has held that an award which is contrary to law may be
corrected.412
A. Modification or Correction by Arbitrators
1. Evident Miscalculation
U.A.A. Section 9 allows arbitrators to modify or correct an award upon
application by a participant where there has been an "evident miscalculation
of figures." Under the counterpart provision of the Massachusetts U.A.A.,413
such an evident miscalculation was held to justify modification in Ciampa
v. Chubb Group.4 In this case, a mistake as to present value led to an
insufficient award. The court did not define "evident miscalculation," but
said "[Ilt is 'evident' within the meaning of § 13(a)(1), that the sum of
$18,837, invested at twelve percent per annum, will not support a weekly
payment of $150 per week for 925 weeks." 15
The court resubmitted the award to the arbitrators for modification, and
held that the twenty-day time limit imposed on modification requests by
Section 9 applied only to applications by parties, and not to resubmission
by a court under Section 13.416 Furthermore, neither a lower court's
suggestion to the parties that they seek reconsideration by the arbitrator nor
the previous and unsuccessful attempt by one of the parties to do so limited
the court's authority to effect direct resubmission' 17
2. Clarification
a. Jurisdiction Denied
410. See Ciampa, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 941, 525 N.E.2d at 1345 (evident miscalculation);
Board of Educ. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 170 Ill. App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711
(1988) (clarification).
411. See Plainfield Community Consol. School Dist. No. 202 v. Lindblad Constr. Co., 174
Ill. App. 3d 149, 528 N.E.2d 996 (1988).
412. See Derry Township Mun. Auth. v. Solomon & Davis, Inc., 272 Pa. Super. 213, 539
A.2d 405 (1988).
413. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 251, § 9 (1988).
414. 26 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 525 N.E.2d 1344 (1988).
415. Id. at 941, 525 N.E.2d at 1345. The sum required to be invested was $137,750.00.
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In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. The Newspaper Guild,"' a dispute
arose over the discharge of Robert Lawlor, an editorial page cartoonist.
The arbitrator's award ordered that Lawlor be reinstated to his former
position or one substantially equivalent and said that the arbitrator would
retain jurisdiction for sixty days to resolve any problems which might arise
in implementing the award.41 9 The newspaper offered Lawlor the position
of advertising artist which he accepted.20 However, twenty-four days after
the award, the guild requested a clarifying order as to whether the
advertising artist position was adequate.421 The arbitrator issued an order
saying Lawlor must be reinstated to his former position if it still existed.422
Philadelphia Newspapers filed an application to vacate the clarifying order
and preclude enforcement on the theory that the arbitrator lacked authority
to clarify the award after it had been rendered.423
The court did not apply the Pennsylvania U.A.A.,424 but relied on
common law's functus officio doctrine to hold the arbitrator did not have
authority to retain jurisdiction or to issue the clarifying award.425 The court
set out policies behind this rule of preventing a "nonjudicial officer,
potentially subject to outside communication and unilateral influence, from
reexamining a final decision" or from imposing obligations outside the
contract.4z The court concluded that while arbitrators could correct clerical
mistakes or obvious errors of arithmetical computation, or adjudicate an
issue previously submitted that was not adjudicated, it was inappropriate for
an arbitrator to implement or monitor compliance with an award unless all
parties consented.427






424. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7311 (1982).
425. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., No. 86-6192 (LEXIS). U.A.A. § 9 and PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7311 (1982) give an arbitrator jurisdiction to modify an award upon request of a party or
submission by a court for the purpose of clarification. However, the newspaper and guild were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement, and the U.A.A. does not apply in cases involving
collective bargaining agreements. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat.









In Board of Education v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,4" a
dispute arose when the Board of Education moved a teacher from an eight-
hour position to a six-hour position.4 An arbitrator found the Board did
not have sufficient reason for the move and ordered the Board to compen-
sate the teacher for lost pay.4" The teachers' union sought clarification of
the award in regard to whether the teacher should be reinstated, and the
arbitrator issued an order for reinstatement.431 The Board misunderstood
the order and did not reinstate the teacher.432 A second union request for
clarification resulted not only in reiteration of the reinstatement order, but
also additional damages for the teachers due to the delay.433
The Board appealed this modified award on the grounds that the
arbitrator's jurisdiction had expired before it was issued.43  Since this
dispute was under a collective bargaining agreement, U.A.A. Section 9
(which provides for modification by arbitrators under certain circumstances)
did not apply.435 The court upheld the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The court
so held based on the consent of the parties,43 and the fact that common law
functus officio doctrine has been weakened by case law and statutes, such
as U.A.A. Section 9.437 The court concluded that *[m]odern theory suggests
a power resides in the arbitrator to make such a ruling absent timely
objection of a party. "4"
3. Mistake of Law
The U.A.A. does not provide for modification of awards which contain
mistakes of law, either by arbitrators or by courts. In Adler v. Safeco Ins.
Co.,439 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the Minnesota arbitration
act did not permit modification of an award even though the award violated
428. 170 II1. App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711 (1988).
429. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 713.
430. Id.
431. Id. at -' 524 N.E.2d at 714.
432. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 715.
433. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 714.
434. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 715.
435. Id. at, 524 N.E.2d at 716.
436. Id.
437. Id. at _, 524 N.E.2d at 715.
438. Id.
439. 413 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Minnesota law.' In Adler, an insurer offered $50,000 in uninsured
motorist benefits to Elizabeth Adler, the widow of an insured.441 Adler
rejected the offer, claiming she should receive underinsured benefits as
well.42 The matter was submitted to arbitration and the panel awarded
$5,000 in uninsured benefits and prejudgment interest." 3  The insurer
requested modification of the award to eliminate the interest under
Minnesota law which denies preaward interest on awards made by ar-
bitrators." The panel modified the award to eliminate the prejudgment
interest.4"
The appellate court held that even though the original interest award
was clearly wrong, the arbitration panel lacked the power to modify the
award. 46 The court concluded that under Minnesota's arbitration act,
arbitrators could modify an award only if there was evident miscalculation
or mistake of description, imperfection in a matter of form, or a need for
clarification." 7 The court held that the modification in this case did not fit
any of the three provisions and thus, must be vacated.'0 The court did note
that many errors in arbitration awards escape remedy due to restrictions on
arbitrators and limited powers of review of courts.44 9
B. Modification or Correction by Courts
1. Award Based on Corruption or Fraud
U.A.A. Section 12(a)(1) provides that an award may be vacated where
it was procured by "corruption, fraud or other undue means." However, the
U.A.A. does not provide for modification in these instances.
In Plainfield Community Consolidated School District No. 202 v. Lindblad
Construction Co.,4s0 a construction contract erupted into a disagreement, and
arbitration resulted in an award for Lindblad.45' Plainfield asked the court
440. Id at 568.
441. Id. at 567.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 568 (construing MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (1986)).
445. Id. at 567.
446. Id. at 568.
447. Id. (construing MINN. STAT. § 572.20(1)-(3) (1986)).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 568.
450. 174 I1. App. 3d 149, 528 N.E.2d 996 (1988).
451. Id. at _, 528 N.E.2d at 997.
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to vacate or modify the award on the grounds that Lindblad's subcontractor,
Asbestos Safety, Inc. [hereinafter A.S.I.] had knowingly presented false
information to the arbitrator regarding the amount owed by Plainfield, and
A.S.I. filed pleadings requesting the court to confirm an arbitration award
which A.S.I. knew was "far in excess of the amount to which A.S.I. had any
right. "452  The court held that "where an arbitration award is in part
improperly procured, only that part will be set aside. "4 53 The award was
reduced from $34,007.49 to $10,567.52. 4s4  Even though the Illinois
arbitration act does not provide for modification in an award procured by
fraud,455 the practical effect of the court's partial vacation was to modify the
award.
2. Arbitrary Awards
In Hialeah Park, Inc. v. Ocala Breeders' Sales Co.,456 an arbitration award
was entered which did not correspond with any combination of Ocala's
claims, nor with a set-off of Hialeah's claims against Ocala's. 457 Hialeah
asked that the award be referred back to the arbitrators or vacated because
it was arbitrary in that it bore "no rational relationship to the evidence that
the parties presented with respect to damages. "458 However, the Florida
U.A.A. 459 does not provide for modification because an award is arbitrary.
The court reasoned that there was no legal requirement that an award
coincide with the parties' requests or that the arbitrators disclose the
"precise mathematical basis" upon which they arrived at the award.46 The
court declined to review the award where it was within the range of
evidence, within the scope of submission to arbitration, and where there was
no clear showing of arbitrator improprieties under Florida law. 61 The court
concluded that it could not review or modify an award which could have
been entered on the evidence presented.6 2
452. Id. at __, 528 N.E.2d at 999.
453. Id.
454. Id. at , 528 N.E.2d at 1000.
455. Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, para. 101-23 (1975).
456. 528 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
457. Id. at 1227.
458. Id.
459. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-682.22 (1982).
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1228 (construing Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1) (1982)).
462. Id. at 1227.
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3. Evidence Admitted
The U.A.A. does not provide for modification of an award due to
evidence considered by the arbitrators, but does provide for correction
where there has been an evident miscalculation.' 3 As the following case
demonstrates, it is important to distinguish a mathematical miscalculation
from a miscalculation which results from the use of erroneous data.
In Glen Johnson, Inc. v. Ruzicka,"" a party appealed from the trial
court's confirmation of an arbitration award on the purported basis that
there was "an evident miscalculation of figures."' Such a miscalculation
would provide grounds for modification under the Florida U.A.A.A6
However, the court found that the motion to vacate the award did not
actually involve an evident miscalculation, but rather "was actually based
upon the contention that the arbitrator's mathematics had been improperly
affected by the consideration of certain evidence." 7 The court held this was
not proper grounds for such a motion under Florida law.46
C. Different Standards in One Statute
The U.A.A. sets forth one standard for modification or correction by
arbitrators and one standard for modification or correction by courts.' 9
However, a state U.A.A. may have different standards for different
situations. 70 The choice of standards may be outcome determinative as
demonstrated in Deny Township Municipal Authority v. Solomon & Davis,
Inc. .471 Derry awarded three sewer system contracts to Solomon. A dispute
arose over the quality of the repaving material used by Solomon.4 2
Pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the dispute was submitted to
arbitration. 4 3 The arbitrators found in Derry's favor on one contract and
in Solomon's favor on another.474 The first issue faced by the court on
463. See U.A.A. § 13.
464. 517 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
465. Id. at 763.
466. FLA. STAT. § 682.14 (1988).
467. 517 So. 2d at 763.
468. Id. (construing FL-A. STAT. § 682.14).
469. See U.A.A. Sections 9 & 13.
470. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7302, 7315, & 7341 (1982).
471. 372 Pa. Super. 213, 539 A.2d 405 (1988).
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Derry's appeal was which standard of review to apply. 7 The Pennsylvania
U.A.A. recognizes three different standards under which an award may be
modified: (1) the common law standard,476 (2) the general statutory
standard,4"' and (3) the contrary to law standard.1
The applicable standard is determined by two factors, one of which is
whether the 1927 or 1980 arbitration act applies.4 9 Derry argued that
Pennsylvania's 1927 act should apply since it was in effect when the
agreement was executed.4w The court held that the 1980 act controlled
because it was in effect on the date the dispute arose and the date the
matter was submitted to arbitration.481
The second issue involved the arbitration agreement in question.'
Derry argued that the contrary to law standard should apply where the
parties showed their intent to have it control by asserting it in their
petitions.4 The court held that the subsequent action of the parties did
not override their original intent as expressed in their contract.4 There-
fore, the common law standard applied since the parties had not taken
affirmative steps to preserve their right to statutory arbitration.4 Once it
was determined that the narrow common law standard of review applied to
the award, Derry could not show reason to modify or vacate. 48 If Derry
had persuaded the court to apply the broad contrary to law standard of
review, modification or vacation might have been possible.
Although finality of awards is important in encouraging the use of
arbitration as a quick and less expensive alternative to litigation, 47 the
restrictions on modification result in erroneous awards being upheld.,m
Although awards may be vacated in more instances than they may be
475. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 407.
476. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7341 (1982).
477. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7315(a) (1982). Similar to U.A.A. § 13(a).
478. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(d)(2) (1982).
479. 372 Pa. Super. at _, 539 A.2d at 408.
480. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 407.
481. Id. at 539 A.2d. at 408.
482. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(a) (1982) which generally provides that an agreement is
conclusively assumed to provide for common law arbitration unless it expressly reserves a right
to statutory arbitration in writing.
483. 372 Pa. Super. at _, 539 A.2d at 409.
484. Id.
485. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 410.
486. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 411.
487. See Lorenzini, 753 S.W.2d at 106.
488. See Adler, 413 N.W.2d at 568.
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modified,' this forces parties to start the arbitration process over again.
Some states have expanded the instances in which awards may be modified
(such as Pennsylvania which allows modification in certain situations where
the U.A.A. would allow only vacation)49 and allow arbitrators to retain
jurisdiction so that modification is more easily accomplished. t  These
provisions reflect an attempt to subject awards to greater modification or
correction.
VII. TIMELINESS
Timeliness issues generally surface in one of three different contexts
under the U.A.A. First, the issue of the timeliness of a demand for
arbitration may arise."9 Because the U.A.A. does not assist courts in
deciding the timeliness of demands for arbitration, courts often leave this
question to the arbitrator who in turn must resolve the issue by interpreting
the arbitration agreement. Second, questions frequently concern the
timeliness of motions to vacate,493 modify, or correct494 an arbitration award,
or of appeals from an arbitration award.49  In determining the timeliness of
these motions or appeals, courts rigidly adhere to the time limits set forth
in the state versions of the U.A.A 496 Finally, timeliness issues occasionally
489. See U.A.A. § 9, 12, & 13.
490. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7341 (1982).
491. See Board of Educ., 170 I11. App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711 (1988).
492. See In re Cameron & Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988); Millwrights
Local 548 v. Robert J. Pugleasa Co., 419 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Ozite Corp. v.
Upholsterers Int'l Union of North Am., 671 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Iii. 1987); Frates v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., _ Mont. _, 760 P.2d 748 (1988).
493. See Bell Cold Storage, Inc. v. Over-the-Road City Transfer Union, 673 F. Supp. 987
(D.Minn. 1987); State Farm v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988); Cady v. Allstate Mutual
Auto Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Local 20 v. Baylor Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
494. See Ciampa v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 235, 525 N.E.2d 1345
(1988).
495. See Seay v. Prudential Ins. Co., 375 Pa. Super. 37, 543 A.2d 1166 (1988).
496. The U.A.A. provides that applications to vacate, modify or correct an arbitration
award must be made within ninety days after the award. U.A.A. §§ 12(b), 13(a). However, if
a motion to vacate is based on allegations of "corruption, fraud, or other undue means," the
ninety day period does not begin to run until "such grounds are known or should have been
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affect actions to confirm or enforce arbitration awards.4 97 When faced with
no statute or court rule controlling the timeliness of actions to confirm or
enforce arbitration awards, courts often turn to analogous state or federal
statutes.
A. Demand for Arbitration
Courts commonly rule that the arbitrator determines the timeliness of
a demand for arbitration. In re Cameron and Griffith4'9 held that because
neither the contract nor a statute or court decision limited the period in
which arbitration could be demanded, the claimant's right to an arbitration
hearing was not barred by a statutory limitation period applying only to an
"action" or "judicial proceeding."499 The contract in question made no
mention of limiting the period in which arbitration could be demanded.
Demand was not made until more than four years after the dispute arose.
However, the court compelled arbitration because the parties freely entered
into the contract to arbitrate knowing that arbitrators could decide their
disputes "according to what was good and equitable."50°
In Millwrights Local 548 v. Robert J. Pugleasa Co.,501 the timeliness issue
centered on whether the union had waived arbitration by waiting eight
months after a grievance procedure had failed in an employee termination
dispute. The trial court denied the union's motion to compel arbitration,
holding that arbitration had been waived."° The appellate court reversed
on the ground that the question of whether arbitration has been waived is
strictly procedural and "more properly addressed to the arbitrator as a
threshold issue."503
The trial court in Ozite Corporation v. Upholsterers International Union"°
granted Ozite's motion to compel arbitration on the ground that because
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act does not specify a
limitation period for filing suit, the appropriate period is determined by
497. See UMW Dist. 4 v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., 681 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa.
1988); Walkerville Educ. Assoc. v. Walkerville Rural Communities School, 165 Mich. App. 341,
418 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
498. 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988).
499. Id.
500. Id. at _, 370 S.E.2d at 705.
501. 419 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
502. Id. at 107.
503. Id. at 109.
504. 671 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. III. 1987).
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state law.5°0 The court reasoned that either the five year period for breach
of oral contract 506 or the ten year period for breach of written contract 5°7
controlled this action wherein the union allegedly breached the collective
bargaining agreement. This court found that the ninety-day period in the
Illinois U.A.A.5°8 was inapplicable because that statute pertained to suits
to vacate arbitration awards, and no arbitration occurred here.5° The court
further noted that the six month statute of limitations period found in
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) had been
utilized in an analogous case in at least one court in that district.51 °
Arbitration was compelled in this case because the suit was timely under
either the applicable state limitation periods or under section 10(b) of the
NLRA.511
In Frates v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,s12 the court affirmed the trial
court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration because Frates signed the
arbitration agreement after the disputed transactions occurred.1 3 The court
reasoned that regardless of the federal and state policies favoring arbitra-
tion,514 this arbitration agreement was unenforceable because "grounds
existed either in law or equity to revoke the entire contract."5 "5 By relying
on principles of contract interpretation, the court deemed the motion to
compel arbitration properly denied via the "prospective nature" of the
subsequently signed arbitration agreement. 16
B. Motions to Vacate, Modify or Correct, and Appeals
Sections 13(a) and 12(b) of the U.A.A. mandate that in order to have
an arbitration award vacated or modified, one must apply to the courts
within ninety days after a copy of the award has been delivered to the
applicant. Courts rigidly adhere to this limitation in order to promote
finality and certainty of awards, to keep arbitration expedient, and to assure
505. Id. at 567.
506. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-205 (1985).
507. Id. at para. 13-206.
508. Id. at para. 12(b).
509. Ozite, 671 F. Supp. at 567.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. _ Mont. __, 760 P.2d 748 (1988).
513. Id. at _, 760 P.2d at 752.
514. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 and MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(1) (1985).
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the prompt correction of any mistake in the process of arbitration. The
limitation is rarely circumvented and then only when these purposes would
not be served.
In Bell Cold Storage, Inc. v. Over-the-Road City Transfer Local 544 ,s
the trial court held that neither party could move to vacate the award until
a final arbitration award had been issued."" The court reasoned that comity
and efficiency were both best served by courts refraining from intervening
in a nonfinal arbitration." 9  The parties had agreed to a two-session,
bifurcated arbitration. After the first hearing, the employer filed an action
to vacate. The action was dismissed and the motion to vacate denied
because the arbitration was not yet final.52
The Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the ninety-day limitation
period under Colorado's U.A.A. 521 in State Farmz v. Cabs, Inc." The court
held that the cab company could have challenged the arbitration statute as
unconstitutional in a motion to vacate on the ground that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers."2 Because their challenge was not brought within
ninety days after a copy of the award was delivered to them, the cab
company's claim was time barred under the U.A.A. 24 The court also held
that the cab company could not present this as a substantive defense to
confirmation of the award. 52  The court analogized such a failure to a
jurisdictional defect in a civil case.52
In Cady v. Allstate Insurance Co.,527 the court denied Cady's motion to
vacate on the ground that she willingly participated in an arbitration
proceeding without preserving the right to challenge the dispute's ar-
bitrability with a timely objection before the hearing on the merits."r Cady
argued that arbitration should not have been compulsory due to the
contract's adhesive nature.5" Nevertheless, the court concluded that even




521. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-214(2) (1987).
522. 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988).
523. Id. at 66.
524. Id at 67.
525. Id.
526. Id.
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where no arbitration agreement exists, a party is estopped from objecting in
an untimely manner.53
In Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No.20 v. Baylor Heating and Air
Conditioning Inc., 31 the court held that Baylor's affirmative defenses to the
union's action to confirm the award were barred because Baylor failed to
move to vacate the award in a timely manner. 32 Because the Labor
Management Relations Act did not provide a time limitation on an action
to vacate an arbitration award, the court determined the timeliness of such
a challenge as a matter of federal law by referring to the Indiana U.AA.
5 33
Due to Baylor's failure to move to vacate the award within ninety days after
the mailing of the award to the parties,5 34 the court barred Baylor's
affirmative defenses in this suit.1
3
The timeliness of a motion to modify or correct an award was the focus
in Ciampa v. Chubb Group of Insurance Conmpanies."0 The court held that
the twenty-day limit found in section 9 of the Massachusetts U.A.A.1
37
applied only to applications for correction or modification and not to
"resubmission ordered by [the] court. " " Hence, section 13(a)(1) of the
U.A.A controlled with its thirty-day limit when it was evident in the
original award that a miscalculation of figures had occurred (i.e., the award
incorrectly implied that the sum of $18,837, invested at twelve percent per
annum, supported a weekly payment of $150 per week for 925 weeks). 39
The court suggested resubmission to the arbitrator5 40 Under section
13(a)(1), Ciampa's application was timely.
The focus in Seay v. Pndential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. ,'41 was
on an apparent procedural conflict between two Pennsylvania U.A.A.
statutes providing for the commencement of the limitations period granted
530. Id.
531. 688 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
532. Id. at 471.
533. Id.
534. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-12 (Bums 1986).
535. Baylor, 688 F. Supp. at 471.
536. 26 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 525 N.E.2d 1344 (1988).
537. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 9 and 13(a)(1) (West 1988).
538. Ciampa, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 942, 525 N.E.2d at 1344.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 941, 525 N.E.2d at 1345.
541. 375 Pa. Super. 37, 543 A.2d 1166 (1988).
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for appealing an arbitrator's award.5"2 Prudential filed a petition to vacate,
which was denied. It then appealed that order only to have it quashed
because final judgment had not been entered. Seay then filed a petition to
confirm which was granted and docketed April 1, 1987. On May 6, 1987,
Prudential appealed again, but because more than thirty days had passed
since the order confirming the award, the court quashed the appeal. 54
After noting the equivocation found in the statutes (one permits an appeal
from an order confirming an award and from final judgment 5" while the
other insists that final judgment be entered for orders confirming awards545),
the court determined that the legislature intended for both sections to be
read together and for orders confirming an award to be reduced to
judgment before they may be appealed.546 Thus, Prudential's appeal was
timely.
C. Actions to Confirm or Enforce
In United Mine Workers District 4 v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp.,s
the court held that the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) six month
limitation period applied to this action. 48 The court's reasoning was based
on the similarities of this action to actions brought under the NLRA.549
The court further found that such an action accrued at the time the union
became or should have become aware that Cyprus was violating or ignoring
the arbitrator's decision. 550 The court reasoned that Pennsylvania's U.A.A.
provision failed to specify a limitation period for enforcement of actions;55 1
542. Id. at ___, 543 A.2d at 1167, Cf. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7320 and 7316 (1980):
Section 7320 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) General Rule--an appeal may be taken from:
(3) A court order confirming or denying confirmation of an award ....
(6) A final judgment or decree of a court entered pursuant to the
provisions of this subchapter."
Section 7316 provides in pertinent part: "Judgment or Decree on Award: Upon the granting of
an order of a court confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or decree shall
be entered in conformity with the order .. "




547. 681 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
548. Id. at 277. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1973).
549. Id.
550. Id. at 278.
551. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7313 (1980).
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that Pennsylvania's residual six year statute of limitations was inappropriate
because it was too lengthy and not analogous to section 301 of the NLRA;
that Pennsylvania's limitation period for contract actions was not sufficiently
analogous; and that Pennsylvania's thirty-day limitation periods for
requesting vacation, modification, or correction were too short and were
wholly distinct actions.5 2 Therefore, the court turned to federal law and
concluded the six months limitation period under section 10(b) of the
NLRA applied.5 3 The court held that the Union's complaint was timely
filed.554
Like the court in Cyprus, the court in Walkerville Education Association
v. Walkerville Rural Communities School,5 5 had to locate and apply an
applicable statute of limitations to an action seeking enforcement of an
arbitration award. Because arbitration proceedings are contractual in
nature, the Michigan labor dispute statute merely states that arbitration
awards arising out of labor disputes "shall be enforceable at law or in equity
as the agreement of the parties."556 The court reasoned that the six month
period under the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) 57 better
applied because the one year period under the arbitration court rule5 8
applies only to arbitration authorized by the arbitration statute.559 Collective
labor contracts are expressly excepted from the statutory arbitration
provisions in Michigan."
The court further held that PERA was not precisely on point because
its limitation period applies only to unfair labor practices charges filed with
the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC). Nevertheless,
in light of the fact that Michigan's U.A.A. does not specify a limitation
period for enforcing an arbitration award,56' and in light of the general
contract limitation period of six years being too lengthy, the court adopted
the six month period found in PERA.56 The court based its decision on
the fact that federal courts had been adopting a similar period under section
552. Cyprus, 681 F. Supp. at 277.
553. Id at 275.
554. IU
555. 165 Mich. App. 341, 418 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
556. Id. at 345, 418 N.W.2d at 461 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.901(4) (West
1978).
557. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.216(a) (West 1978).
558. Mich. Stat. Ann. Rule 3.602(1) (Callahan 1985).
559. Walkerville, 165 Mich. App. at 344, 418 N.W.2d at 460.
560. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5001(3) (West 1987).
561. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.9d (West 1978).
562. Walkerville, 165 Mich. App. at _, 418 N.W.2d at 461.
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10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act; that using PERA furthers the
state's policy in favor of promptly resolving labor disputes in the public
sector; and that uniformity of statute of limitations is advanced.56
The law regarding issues of timeliness remains consistent. Courts are
continuing to defer to the arbitrator on the purely procedural questions of
the timeliness of demands for arbitration because of "the desirability of
deferring to someone familiar with the practices in the industry and the
avoidance of duplication and delay."5s Moreover, courts are continuing to
strictly adhere to the limitation periods required under the state U.A.A.'s
regarding vacation and modification or correction. In construing statutory
limits on the right to appeal an arbitration award, courts adhere to strict
interpretations of the statutes. Finally, courts are reaching out to homologi-
cal statutes in their attempts to fill voids left by state legislatures in
providing for a period within which one may resort to the courts to compel
enforcement or confirmation of arbitration awards. A six month period has
found favor in at least two courts.65
VIII. JUDGMENTS ON AWARDS
A. Attorney's Fees
The U.A.A. provides that an arbitrator's expenses and fees, unless
otherwise provided for in the agreement, may be assessed in the award.
Conversely, if the arbitration agreement is silent as to attorney's fees, they
may not be made a part of the arbitration award. 56 The U.A.A. seems clear
as to the arbitrator's authority to assess attorney's fees if the agreement so
stipulates. Recent cases have addressed the issue of the reviewing court's
authority to assess attorney's fees incurred during the arbitration proceeding
as a sanction against a party who brings a frivolous suit.
In Reilly v. Newman, 67 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
the circuit court did not have the authority to order payment of the
defendant's attorney's fees that had been incurred during the arbitration
563. Id.
564. See Millwrights Local v. Robert J. Pugleasa Co., 419 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Retail Delivery Local 588 v. Servomation, Corp., 717 F.2d 475, 477 (9th
Cir. 1983)).
565. See Walkerville, 165 Mich. App. at _, 418 N.W.2d at 461; Cyrus, 681 F. Supp at 275.
566. U.A.A. § 10.
567. 74 Md. App. 281, 536 A.2d 1230 (1988), afpd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 314
Md. 364, 550 A.2d 959 (1988).
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proceeding as a sanction for maintaining an unjustified action."s Reilly
filed a malpractice claim against Dr. Newman, alleging that the doctor
negligently executed a certificate for involuntary admission to a mental
health facility.569 An award of no liability on the malpractice claim was
rendered by the arbitration panel.570 On appeal, the circuit court awarded
the physician costs and attorney's fees.57' The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that it was error for the circuit court to have awarded
attorney's fees and remanded the case for modification to exclude attorney's
fees.57 The court stated that the arbitration panel had the authority under
Maryland law573 to order attorney's fees against a party who brought a claim
in bad faith, but that the circuit court's power is limited to imposing
sanctions for fees and costs incurred after the action was filed. 74
In Plainfield Community Consolidated School District No. 2 v. Lindblad
Construction Co.,575 the Illinois Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of
whether the trial court could properly award attorney's fees incurred during
the arbitration hearing. In Plainfield, a dispute arising out of construction
work was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award against
the school district for the full amount requested.5 76 Subsequently, the school
district discovered that one of the subcontractors had intentionally mis-
represented the amount owed and moved the court to modify or vacate the
award on this basis.5" The trial court awarded attorney's fees and costs to
both the contractor and the school district from the initiation of arbitration
as a result of the subcontractor's misrepresentations before both the
568. Id. at 292, 536 A.2d at 1235.
569. Id at __ 536 A.2d at 1232.
570. Id
571. Id
572. Id at , 536 A.2d at 1234-35.
573. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07(a) (Repl. Vol. 1984)(Cum. Supp.
1988) provides:
(a) Action maintaincd in bad faith - If the arbitration panel finds that the conduct
of any party in maintaining or defending any action is in bad faith or without
substantial justification, the panel may require the offending party, the attorney
advising the conduct, or both, to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding
and reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse
party in opposing it. A detcrmination made under the subsection shall become part
of the panel award and subject to judicial review.
574. Reilly, 74 Md. App. at 292, 536 A.2d at 1235.
575. 174 III. App. 3d 149, 528 N.E.2d 996 (1988).
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arbitrator and the court. 78 The appellate court held that without clear
statutory authorization, it could not award fees incurred during arbitration., 9
The Florida District Court of Appeals followed this holding in Glen
Johnson, Inc. v. L. M. Lowdenshell, Inc.,"a by remanding for recomputation
an award of attorney's fees made by the circuit court. The circuit court had
assessed attorney's fees which were incurred during both the arbitration and
enforcement process. The district court remanded the award to the circuit
court for recomputation to exclude those attorney's fees arising from the
arbitration proceeding."8' Attorney's fees for arbitration proceedings are
expressly excluded by Florida's arbitration code unless provided for in the
arbitration agreement."s The legislature eliminated such fees from the
subject matter jurisdiction of arbitration because "arbitrators are generally
businessmen chosen for their expertise in particular subject matter of suit
and are not necessarily knowledgeable concerning legal fees.""
Ierna v. Arthur Murray International, Inc." held that even though the
arbitration agreement did not clearly indicate that the parties intended the
prevailing party to recover attorney's fees, if the language of the agreement
is susceptible to that interpretation, the arbitrator is reasonable in awarding
them.58 In Ierna, the appellants argued that the only reason the arbitrators
interpreted the language of the agreement to include assessment of
attorney's fees was because the lower court in its order granting a motion
to confirm the amended award and remanding had instructed them to do
so." The court firmly announced that this order did not remand the case
to the arbitrators to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded,
but remanded it to the arbitrators "for a determination of such costs and
expenses to which the defendants may be entitled."5 87  Thus, it was the
arbitration panel, not the district court, which interpreted the language to
include attorney's fees. The court conceded that the language of the
arbitration agreement was not clear as to whether the parties intended the
prevailing party to recover attorney's fees, but they did agree that it was
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. 520 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
581. Id. at 298.
582. FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1985).
583. Id.
584. 833 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1987).
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susceptible to that interpretation." They concluded that "[w]hether this
language included attorneys' fees was an arbitrable issue, and the arbitrators'
interpretation is reasonable. "89
B. Prejudgment Interest
The U.A.A. is silent as to when an award of prejudgment interest is
appropriate. Generally, a court will not add prejudgment interest to an
arbitration award."90
In Adler v. Safeco Insurance Co.,"91 the court reviewed an arbitration
panel's modification of its own award where the panel had erroneously
awarded prejudgment interest. The arbitration panel awarded uninsured
motorist benefits, prejudgment interest, and costs to the widow of an
accident victim. The insurer requested the panel to modify its award to
eliminate the prejudgment interest because the Minnesota U.A.A. s"
prohibited such an award based on the facts of the case. The arbitration
panel then reversed the interest award.593
When the widow sought judicial review, the court held that while the.
award of prejudgment interest was incorrectly made, Minnesota's arbitratiofi
act"9 did not permit the panel to modify its erroneous award. The court
further stated that there was no statutory or case law authority which gave
the district court jurisdiction to vacate an award because the arbitrators
made an error of law.s95
In United Services Automobile Association v. Snith,59 the court reviewed
an appeal from an arbitration panel and awarded prejudgment interest on
a settlement offer made by Smith's underinsured driver's liability carrier.
The Smiths, who had uninsured motorists coverage with United Services
Automobile Association (USAA), were injured in an automobile accident
involving an underinsured driver. The driver's liability carrier offered to
settle with the Smiths for $30,000, but USAA refused to give the Smiths
permission to settle with the carrier. The claim was arbitrated before a
588. Id
589. Id.
590. See Recent Dei'clopnenis: The Unifonn Arbitration Act, 1987 Mo. . DiSP. RES. 221.
591. 413 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
592. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.09 subd. 1(b) (West 1988).
593. Alder, 413 N.W.2d at 567.
594. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.16 (West 1988) provides that the basis for an arbitrator to
modify an award is limited to mistakes of form, description, or calculation.
595. Adler, 413 N.W.2d at 568.
596. 527 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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panel which awarded the Smiths a total of $82,000.597 The award stated that
due to a stipulation of the parties, no ruling as to issues of interest were
made.59 The trial court entered judgment for the Smiths, and the insurer
appealed.5"
The Florida District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
awarding prejudgment interest on the $30,000, even though the insurer had
refused to give the insureds permission to accept." The court reasoned
that it was not until the arbitration award was made that the Smiths had an
enforceable contract.601 On the same reasoning, the court agreed that the
trial court was correct in awarding interest on the sum of $82,000 from the
date of the arbitration award until the date of payment.'
IX. APPEALS
U.A.A. Section 19 allows an appeal (1) from an order denying an
application to compel arbitration, (2) from an order granting an application
to stay arbitration, (3) from on order confirming or denying confirmation
of an award, (4) from an order modifying or correcting an award, (5) from
an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing and (6) from a
judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of the U.A.A. 3 The
U.A.A. states that the appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same
extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.'
In Cheni-Ash, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light,605 the court held that an
order by a trial court compelling arbitration was not appealable. Arkansas
Power & Light argued that the order was not appealable under the U.A.A.
provisions.' Chem-Ash argued the court must rely on Rule 2(a) of the
Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure which it interpreted as indicating
that an order compelling arbitration is final and appealable. 7 The court
concluded that the order did not in effect determine the action or discon-
tinue it as required for an appealable order under Rule 2(a), but the matter
597. Id. at 282.
598. Id.
599. Id
600. Id at 283.
601. Id at 283-84.
602. Id. at 283.
603. U.A.A. § 10.
604. Id.
605. 296 Ark. 83, 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988).
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had merely been referred to arbitration.' Chem-Ash could appeal the
arbitration decision, obtain review, and raise any questions concerning the
trial court's order on that appeal.6 The court based this decision on the
policy that if it permitted an appeal from every order compelling arbitration,
the court would twice review the case and the policy favoring arbitration
would be frustrated. 10
In Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,611 the court
held an order denying an application to compel arbitration is subject to
interlocutory appeal, notwithstanding that such an interlocutory appeal
conflicts with Kansas statutory law.61 Kansas law lists those subjects which
are subject to interlocutory appeal, and arbitration appeals are not within
that list.6 13  However, the Kansas U.A.A. allows for appeal from "orders
denying applications granting applications to compel arbitration. "614 The
court held that the Kansas U.A.A. took precedence over the Kansas statute
and permitted interlocutory appeal.615
In Board of Education v. Compton ,616 the Illinois Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Act61 7 divests the circuit courts of jurisdiction to vacate or enforce arbitra-
tion awards in public education. 18 The court held that it was the intention
of the legislature to divest the circuit courts of judicial review of this class
of arbitration awards.6 19 It specifically noted that the absence of any
reference in the Act to the Illinois U.A.A.6 2 0 "strongly suggests that the
legislature did not intend review of arbitration awards by the circuit courts,




611. 12 Kan. App. 2d 546, 751 P.2d 146 (1988).
612. Id. at _, 751 P.2d at 149-50.
613. Id. at __, 751 P.2d at 149 (construing KAN. STAT. ANN. 5-418 (1986)).
614. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-418 (1982).
615. Kansas Gas, 12 Kan. App. al _, 751 P. 2d at 149.
616. 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
617. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1701 (1985).
618. Board of Educ., 123 11.2d at _, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
619. Id at __, 526 N.E.2d at 152-53.
620. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 101-23 (1985).
621. Board of Educ., 123 1l1.2d at _, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
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courts, absent an unfair labor practice,62 was said to "jibe[] with the [Illinois




In Karbowski v. Bradgate Associates, Inc.,2 4 the appellate court held that
the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion to
vacate the arbitrator's award. Following an arbitration award, the plaintiff
filed a motion to vacate in district court which was denied.62 The
Massachusetts' U.A.A. provides that, "upon application of a party, the court
shall vacate an award."6 26 Since there is nothing in the statute which defines
the word "court", the appellate court looked to another section of the
statute which specifically refers to the superior court as the forum where
"initial application (to vacate) shall be made."627
In Board of Education v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,628 a
teacher alleged that the school board engaged in unfair labor practices by
refusing to abide by an arbitration award handed down by the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB). The school board challenged
the jurisdiction of the IELRB in that the complaint was not timely filed. 629
The court ruled that the IELRB has jurisdiction to render an arbitration
award in response to a labor grievance under the U.A.A.630
B. Standing
622. Unfair labor practice was dcfined as the refusal to "comply with a binding arbitration
award." Id. Thus, there would be judicial review if the losing party at arbitration refuses to
comply.
623. Id. at _, 526 N.E.2d at 154.
624. 25 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 520 N.E.2d 504 (1988).
625. Id at _, 520 N.E.2d at 505.
626. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 251, § 12(a) (1972).
627. Karbowski, 25 Mass. App. at _, 520 N.E.2d at 506 (construing MASS. GEN. L. ch.
251, § 17 (1960).
628. 170 I1. App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711 (1988).
629. Id at _, 524 N.E.2d at 716.
630. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 101-23 (1983).
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In Svoboda v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Dis-
abilities 1, the court held that discharged employees had standing to
challenge an arbitrator's award issued after the union challenged the
discharge, regardless of whether discharged employees alleged and proved
that the union did not adequately represented them in arbitration proceed-
ings. 632 According to company rules, an individual employee is allowed to
bring a grievance on his own without the aid of his union.63 In this case,
plaintiffs brought an action under the Illinois U.A.A.6 to vacate a labor
arbitrator's decision to uphold the discharge of the plaintiffs from their
employment positions with defendant.6" The Illinois Public Relations Act,636
which governed the case and was subject to the Illinois U.A.A., limits
actions seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award to "parties" to a collective
bargaining agreement. 37 The Svoboda court found that "parties" includes
not only unions and employers, but also individual employees, and thus,
individual employees have standing to bring an action to vacate an
arbitrator's award.63 The Svoboda court further held that although the
collective bargaining agreement provided that "the decision and award of
arbitration shall be final and binding," the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act (which is subject to the Illinois U.A.A.) does not preclude plaintiffs'
standing to petition to vacate an arbitration award.6 39
XI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Upon appeal of an arbitration award, a court must establish the scope
of review.' 0 In doing so, the court may not always look first to the
individual state's U.A.A. for this standard. Rather, the court will look to
the source of the arbitration and determine whether the U.A.A. standard is
applicable.
631. 162 III. App. 3d 366, 515 N.E.2d 446 (1987).
632. Id. at 369, 515 N.E.2d at 449.
633. Id. at 369, 515 N.E.2d at 448 (construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1616 (1985)).
634. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 101-23 (1961).
635. Svoboda, 162 II. App. 3d at 366-67, 515 N.E.2d at 446.
636. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-27 (1984).
637. Id. at para. 1616.
638. Svoboda, 162 I1. App. 3d at 367, 515 N.E.2d at 447 (construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
48, para. 1606(b) (1985)).
639. Id. at 372, 515 N.E.2d at 450 (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1608 & 1616
(1985)).
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Under some circumstances, courts have rejected the argument that they
should abandon their common law standard of review in favor of the
standard of review offered in their state's U.A.A6 14 This is particularly true
when arbitration of a matter is mandated by statute, or application of the
U.A.A. is not expressly provided for in the agreement.62  It is also
important to note that courts will apply a different standard of review in
considering an interlocutory appeal. 43
In Carbondale v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 63,' the court held
that in arbitration awards under Act 111,645 judicial review "is available only
by narrow certiorari where the only questions that can be considered are
questions of jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings before the
arbitrator, excess in the exercise of powers, and constitutional issues. " '
Since the arbitrator's award was drawn from the "essence" of the agreement
of the parties, it was not to be disturbed.67 The court noted further that
the scope of review set out in the Pennsylvania U.A.A.6 did not apply to
Act 111 cases." 9
The commonwealth court in Carbondale cited approvingly another Act
1II case which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided earlier that
same year. That case, In re Upper Providence Police Delaware County Lodge
#27,650 also recognized the narrow certiorari by which there can be judicial
review of limited issues. 1  The court further held that the Pennsylvania
U.A.A. and its procedures would apply only to collective bargaining
agreements where it was "consistent with any statute regulating labor and
management relations."6s2 It then concluded that the standard of review set
641. See Carbondale v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 63, 109 Pa. Commw. 325, 531
A.2d 76 (1987); In re Upper Providence Police Delaware County Lodge #27 Fraternal Order
of Police, 514 Pa. 501, 526 A.2d 315 (1987).
642. See International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1619 v. Prince George's County, 74 Md.
App. 438, 538 A2d 329 (1988).
643. See Wetzel v. Sullivan, 745 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
644. 109 Pa. Commw. 325, 531 A.2d 76 (1987).
645. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 217.1-10. to
217.10. This act authorizes collective bargaining by municipal police and fire fighters.
646. Carbondale, 109 Pa. Commw. at 326, 531 A.2d at 77.
647. Id. at 326, 531 A.2d at 77.
648. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7301 to 7320 (1980).
649. Carbondale, 109 Pa. Commw. at _, 531 A.2d at 78.
650. 514 Pa. 501, 526 A.2d 315 (1987).
651. 1d at __, 526 A.2d at 371.
652. Id. at __, 526 A.2d at 318 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(b) (1980)).
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by the U.A.A. was inconsistent with the standard of review previously
established by Act 111 cases.6"
In International Association of Firefighters, Local 1619 v. Prince George's
County,5 4 an order to vacate an arbitration award was sought on the basis
that the arbitrators made errors of law and fact and thereby exceeded their
authority in fashioning a disciplinary proceeding less severe than that
determined by the county fire department.6" The trial court vacated, and
the union appealed. The Court of Special Appeals held that absent a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement expressly providing for the
application of the Maryland U.A.A.,6" "the common law principles
governing review of arbitration awards control . .,,6 Thus, the court
applied the Maryland common law rule that an award should be vacated
only if it was procured by fraud, misconduct, bias, prejudice, corruption, lack
of good faith by the arbitrator, a mistake so gross as to imply bad faith or
lack of honest judgment, and where the award is against clear public policy,
but not on the basis of "mere errors of law or fact."6 8
The court further concluded that the authority of the arbitrators to
fashion a remedy was broad, and, absent provisions to the contrary in the
agreement, the court should defer to the judgment of the arbitrators. 9
Based on this standard, the court reversed the trial court's ruling and
directed it to confirm the arbitrators' award.6"
While the previously cited cases set out when courts are unwilling to
look to their state's U.A.A. for the standard of review, courts will look to
the U.A.A. for the standard of review in cases which the parties have freely
entered into an agreement providing for arbitration. In these cases, the
courts are willing to give the parties what they bargained for.6 1 Most states'
arbitration acts provide that an arbitrator's decision is presumed valid unless
one of the express provisions for vacating an award can be proven 66" or
653. Id. at _, 526 A.2d at 319-20,
654. 74 Md. App. 438, 538 A.2d 329 (1988).
655. Id. at 443, 538 A.2d at 331.
656. MD. CS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201-24 (1984 Repl. Vol.).
657. 74 Md. App. at 444, 538 A.2d at 331. See, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
206(b).
658. Firefighters, 74 Md. App. at 445, 538 A.2d at 332.
659. Id. at 446-49, 538 A.2d at 333-34.
660. Id. at 450, 538 A.2d at 335.
661. See Cameron v. Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988).
662. See Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority, 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d
122, 127 (1988). See also, Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App.
1987) (review of arbitrators decision limited to IDAHO CODE § 7-912 (1986)).
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unless the arbitrator exceeded his power.' This is true even if the award
is not one which a court of law or equity would or could have given.' In
an effort not to dilute the purpose of arbitration, these courts follow the
explicit language of their respective U.A.A.'s.
In In re Cameron and Griffith,"5 the parties entered into a contract for
the sale of 1,680 shares of stock of National Storage Company. In addition
to the initial purchase price, the contract provided that if the buyer sold the
company stock or assets, the seller would receive one-third of the
proceeds. 6" The contract also provided that all disputes would be settled
by arbitration."1' Four years later, buyer sold the majority of the company
to a third party and failed to turn over any of the proceeds to the seller.
Following arbitration the claimant was awarded $66,323.66 The award was
confirmed by the trial court and the respondent appealed, claiming the
statute of limitations had run, divesting the arbitrator of authority to hear
the claim." 9 The court determined that even if the arbitrator was mistaken
as to the statute of limitations, it was a hazard the parties had assumed
when they agreed to arbitrate and was not reviewable.67  Where the
contract to arbitrate was freely entered into, "an arbitrator's mistake, either
as to law or fact, is 'the misfortune of the party.
"671
Similarly, the court in Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Authority672
bound the parties to the arbitrators' decision. Jackson sought confirmation
of an arbitrator's award in his favor for work he had performed and for
improper seizure of equipment. Mid States contended that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers and moved to vacate the award relating to the
equipment seizure.673 The district court found for Jackson. On appeal, the
court held that "[glenerally where the parties have agreed to be bound to
a submission to arbitration, errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision
of matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators are insufficient to
663. See Jackson Trak, 242 Kan. at _, 751 P.2d at 130.
664. See Wilkes-Barre Area Educ. Assoc. v. Wilkes-Barre Area School Dist., 113 Pa.
Commw. 492, 538 A.2d 81 (1988).




669. Id at _, 370 S.E.2d at 705.
670. Id.
671. Id.
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invalidate an award fairly made."674 The court further held an award is
presumptively valid unless one of the specific grounds in the state arbitra-
tion act can be proved.' "lIlt is not the function of the court to hear the
case de novo and consider the evidence presented to the arbitrators."676
In Cady v. Allstate Insurance Co.,67 the court also declined to grant a
trial de novo. Following an automobile accident in which her husband had
been seriously injured, Anita Cady's claim for damages was denied by an
arbitration board. 67' Anita moved for a trial de novo, and a declaration that
the arbitrator's decision was null and void. 679 The court held that judicial
review of an arbitrator's award was much more limited than that for a trial,
and that the review was limited to the state's U.A.A.6° It concluded that
to grant a trial de novo would defeat the purpose of the U.A.A.'6 1
Other courts have not been willing to expand the scope of review even
when there is a mistake as to law or fact. In determining the scope of
review, the court in Lorenzini v. Group Health Plan, Inc.i' turned to the
express language of the U.A.A." and held that it was irrelevant whether the
arbitrator's interpretation of the contract was wrong because an arbitrator's
erroneous interpretation of the law does not violate his power and
authority.'
In Wilkes-Barre Area Educational Association v. Wilkes-Barre Area School
District,' the court on appeal stated that the scope of review of the
arbitrator's decision was limited and would "not be overturned if it draws
its essence" from the agreement between the parties.68 This essence test
simply means that "[ilf the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed
within the terms of the agreement, 'the validity of the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion is not a matter of concern to the court.'" 7 The court further held that
674. Id. at __, 751 P.2d at 127.
675. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412.
676. Jackson Trak, 242 Kan. at __, 751 P.2d at 127.
677. 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
678. Id. at __ 747 P.2d at 77.
679. Id. at __, 747 P.2d at 78.
680. IDAHO CODE § 7-912 (1986).
681. Cady, 113 Idaho at _, 747 P.2d at 79.
682. 753 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
683. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.405.1 (1986).
684. Lorenzini, 753 S.W.2d at 108.
685. 113 Pa. Commw. 492, 538 A.2d 81 (1988).
686. Id. at _., 538 A.2d at 83. The litigants were parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.
687. Id. (Emphasis in the original).
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the agreement would be examined taking into account its language, context,
and other indicia of the parties' intention.6 Moreover, it found that even
though the relief granted by the arbitrator "could not or would not be
granted" by a law or equity court, this was an insufficient ground for
vacation or for refusing confirmation.' The court additionally found that
judicial interference is not justified or warranted merely because the
arbitrator erroneously resolved the question presented to him.'
Not all jurisdictions have been willing to sit by while mistakes as to law
go unchallenged.6' In Winters v. Erie Insurance Group,62 the insured sought
review of an arbitrator's decision that an insurer was not required to pay a
disputed uninsured motorist claim.693 The decision was confirmed at the
trial level, but was reversed on appeal based on the arbitrator's misinter-
pretation of law.' The court said the proper scope of review was provided
in the state arbitration act6s which states that an arbitrator's award may be
modified or corrected where "the award is contrary to law and is such that
had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different
judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict."' The court stated
that the arbitrator's interpretation of the insurance policy was contrary not
only to legal principles, but also to common sense and therefore, reversed
the decision of the trial court. 7 The insurer argued for a different standard
of review but was unpersuasive.'
When a states arbitration statute, which is dissimilar to the U.A.A., is
repealed and replaced with a U.A.A. provision, the standard of review a
court uses in reviewing the arbitrator's actions is usually determined by the
date the dispute arose.69
688. Id. at _, 538 A.2d at 83-84.
689. Id. at _, 538 A.2d at 84. See, Pennsylvania U.A.A. at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
7314(a)(2) (1986).
690. Wilkes-Barre, 113 Pa. Commw. at _, 538 A.2d at 84.
691. See Winters v. Erie Ins. Group, 367 Pa. Super. 253, 532 A.2d 885 (1987).
692. Id.
693. Id
694. Id. at _, 532 A.2d at 887.
695. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(d)(2) (1986).
696. Winters, 367 Pa. Super.at _, 532 A.2d at 886.
697. Id. at _, 532 A.2d at 887.
698. Id. at __ 532 A.2d at 886. The insurer argued that 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7314 &
7315 (1986) (which are patterned after U.A.A. §§ 12 & 13) should apply. The court said that
the insurer waived its right to argue for this standard of review on appeal because it argued at
trial for the "contrary to law" standard which the court applied here. Id.
699. See Derry Township Mun. Authority v. Solomon & Davis, Inc., 372 Pa. Super. 213,
539 A.2d 405 (1988).
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In Deny Township Municipal Authority v. Solomon & Davis, Inc., TM a dispute
arose concerning certain descriptions for repaving materials contained in a
series of contracts entered into by the parties.70' The contracts were entered
into before the state adopted the U.A.A. statute.7' The dispute arose, and
an arbitration hearing was held on the issue, after the adoption and the
effective date of the U.A.A. statute. 3 Derry Township sought to vacate,
modify, or correct the arbitration award which had been in favor of
Solomon & Davis, Inc.71
The question posed to the court was which standard of review should
be used in reviewing the arbitrator's decision.' M Under the previous
arbitration act, the standard of review to be used by the courts in reviewing
an arbitrator's actions was similar to the standard for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.7°6 Under the newly adopted act, an award will be
disturbed only in narrowly drawn circumstances, and therefore, if used, the
petitioning party will not be as likely to obtain relief as one might have
under the old act.707 Also, under the common law rules for arbitration in
Pennsylvania, an award will only be disturbed where "it is clearly shown that
a party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, or corruption or
other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable, or
unconscionable award."7'
The court concluded that the new act should govern the dispute since
it arose and was arbitrated after the effective date for the new act.7°9 The
court then looked to the act to determine whether the arbitration will be
governed by statutory or common law rules."' The new act states that an
agreement to arbitrate is presumed to be governed by common law rules
unless the agreement expressly provides for statutory arbitration.711 Thus,
the court concluded that since the arbitration provision in the contract did
not expressly provide for statutory arbitration, common law arbitration rules
700. Id.
701. Id. at __, 539 A.2d at 406.
702. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 408.
703. Id.
704. Id. at , 539 A.2d at 406.
705. Id. at -, 539 A.2d at 406-07.
706. Id. at -, 539 A.2d at 407.
707. Id.
708. Id. at _, 539 A.2d at 408.
709. Id.
710. Id. (construing 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7302(a) (Purdon 1986)).
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will apply.712 The court applied the narrow common law standard of review
and upheld the arbitrator's award as there was no evidence presented
alleging that Derry was denied a hearing, or that fraud or misconduct
occurred on the part of the arbitrators.713
712. Id. at 539 A.2d at 410.
713. Id. at __ 539 A.2d at 411.
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